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REASKING THE WOMAN QUESTION AT DIVORCE
PENELOPE E. BRYAN*
Feminists have said much about women's experiences at divorce.,
They also have developed theories and proposed changes in legal
standards and procedures that would benefit divorcing women. Yet
women remain disadvantaged during divorce and face numerous
hardships after their marriages dissolve. The disconnect between
feminist contributions and what women continue to experience at
divorce raises questions about feminism's relevance to divorce. This
Essay explores those questions. Part I outlines the problems women
face at divorce. Part II describes various feminist solutions to the
problems noted in Part I. Finally, Part III examines barriers to the
implementation of feminist proposals and suggests strategies for
overcoming these impediments.
I. EXPOSING THE PROBLEM
The assertion that many divorced women and their dependent
children suffer financial hardship no longer sparks controversy. Many
feminists and others have done much to expose and establish that the
standards of living of many women decline precipitously at divorce.2
* I gratefully acknowledge Nancy Ehrenreich for her helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this Essay.
1. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 477-87
(1999) (discussing some of the feminist contributions to divorce).
2 See, e.g., TERRY ARENDELL, MOTHERS AND DIVORCE: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND
SOCIAL DILEMMAS 154-56 (1986); REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 19 (1989) [hereinafter
MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT]; LESLIE A. MORGAN, AFTER MARRIAGE ENDS:
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR MIDLIFE WOMEN 24-28, 72, 74-76, 79-83 (1991); LENORE J.
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN
AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 323-56 (1985); Ruth A. Brandwein et al., Women and Children
Last: The Social Situation of Divorced Mothers and Their Families, 36 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
498, 500 (1974); Mary Corcoran et al., The Economic Fortunes of Women and Children: Lessons
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 10 SIGNS 232, 240-41, 244, 247 (1984); Peggy S.
Draughn, Divorcees' Economic Well-Being and Financial Adequacy as Related to Interfamily
Grants, 22 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 23, 24-25 (1994); Marsha Garrison, Child Support
Policy: Guidelines and Goals, 33 FAM. L.Q. 157, 157-59 & nn.1-16 (1999) [hereinafter Garrison,
Child Support Policy]; Marsha Garrison, Equitable Distribution in New York: Results and
Reform, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 720 tbl.55 (1991) [hereinafter Garrison, Equitable Distribution
in New York] (noting that the average postdivorce per capita income of wives and children
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Moreover, many divorced women experience difficulty finding work,
remain trapped in low-paying jobs, and/or work two jobs to survive. 3
Financial problems compromise the physical and psychological health
of divorced women,4 as well as that of their children.'
Discrimination against women in the workplace helps explain
women's financial vulnerability at divorce,6 but many other factors
contribute as well. Wives generally become financially dependent
upon their husbands. 7 At divorce, a time when wives have little
access to their husbands' earnings, 8 many wives cannot afford, and
approximates 68% of their before-divorce per capita income, whereas the per capita income of
husbands increases by 182% after divorce); James B. McLindon, Separate but Unequal: The
Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 351-52 (1987); Bea
Ann Smith, Why the Community Property System Fails Divorced Women and Children, 7 TEX.
J. WOMEN & L. 135, 137 (1998) (noting that the households of divorced women and children
now have replaced the elderly as the most likely households to live at or below the poverty
level); Robert S. Weiss, The Impact of Marital Dissolution on Income and Consumption in
Single-Parent Households, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 115, 116-17 (1984). The postdivorce
decline in standard of living affects women at all socioeconomic levels and impacts women of
upper socioeconomic status most severely. See MORGAN, supra, at 25-62; Paul R. Amato, The
Impact of Divorce on Men and Women in India and the United States, 25 J. COMP. FAM. STUD.
207, 211 (1994). Moreover, the economic decline of divorced women usually remains constant,
unless remarriage occurs. See MORGAN, supra, at 27; Grace Ganz Blumberg, Balancing the
Interests: The American Law Institute's Treatment of Child Support, 33 FAM. L.Q. 39, 42 n.5
(1999).
3. See Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women's Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for
Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1165-67 & nn.48-54 (1999).
4. See id. at 1167 & n.55.
5. See id. at 1157-65 & nn.19-45; Garrison, Child Support Policy, supra note 2, at 157-58 &
nn.2-4.
6. See, e.g., ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN IN THE CALIFORNIA
COURTS: FINAL REPORT 121 (Gay Danforth & Bobbie L. Welling eds., 1996) [hereinafter
CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT]; ARENDELL, supra note 2, at 53-61; NANCY E. DOWD, IN
DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES 22 (1997); DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., GENDER JUSTICE
171 (1986); MORGAN, supra note 2, at 10-12; Terry J. Arendell, Women and the Economics of
Divorce in the Contemporary United States, 13 SIGNS 121, 129-30 (1987); Bryan, supra note 3, at
1206-08; M. M. Slaughter, The Legal Construction of Mother, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST
THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 73, 82, 84 (Martha Albertson
Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995); Joan Williams, Towards a Reconstructive Feminism:
Reconstructing the Relationship of Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 89,
113-14 (1998); see also Marta Elliott, The Determinants of Young Women's Wages: Comparing
the Effects of Individual and Occupational Labor Market Characteristics, 25 SOC. SCI. RES. 240,
256 (1996) (discussing her findings that suggest that employers discriminate against white
women on the basis of their motherhood).
7. See MORGAN, supra note 2, at 7-10; Bryan, supra note 3, at 1172-73; Ira Mark Elman,
The Maturing Law of Divorce Finances: Toward Rules and Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 801, 802-04
(1999); Garrison, Equitable Distribution in New York, supra note 2, at 652 (finding that in
contested custody cases husbands' incomes averaged approximately three times those of wives);
Slaughter, supra note 6, at 73, 82-83.
8. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 192-93; OHIO JOINT TASK
FORCE ON GENDER FAIRNESS: A FINAL REPORT 72 (1995) [hereinafter OHIO GENDER BIAS
REPORT]; Bryan, supra note 3, at 1173-74.
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proceed without, adequate legal representation. 9 Even if a wife
initially can afford to hire a lawyer, the funds she can expend on
attorney's fees lessens as her husband and his attorney employ
adversarial tactics that enhance the cost of divorce, prolong
resolution,10 and force her to accept an inadequate settlement."
Sometimes the wife's lawyer abandons her in the middle of the
divorce proceeding, leaving her without representation. 2 Even if a
wife can afford attorney's fees, her funds may not be sufficient to hire
necessary experts" or conduct formal discovery.14 The presentation
9. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 193-94; MASSACHUSETTS
GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 20-21; OHIO GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 8, at
72-74; REPORT OF THE OREGON SUPREME COURT/OREGON STATE BAR TASK FORCE ON
GENDER FAIRNESS 55 (1998) [hereinafter OREGON GENDER BIAS REPORT]; KAREN WINNER,
DIVORCED FROM JUSTICE: THE ABUSE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN BY DIVORCE LAWYERS
AND JUDGES xviii-xxxix (1996); Bryan, supra note 3, at 1174-75; Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic
Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on Gender Bias in the
Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 250 n.11 (1993). Judges exacerbate this problem by their frequent
refusal to award attorney fees during and/or after the divorce proceeding. See CALIFORNIA
GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 201-02; MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT,
supra note 2, at 21; OHIO GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 72-74; Czapanskiy, supra, at
250 n.11; Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, 42 FLA. L. REV.
803, 804-05 (1990) [hereinafter Florida Gender Bias Report]; Report of the Missouri Task Force
on Gender and Justice, 58 MO. L. REV. 485, 528, 550-51 (1993) [hereinafter Missouri Gender
Bias Report].
10. See Bryan, supra note 3, at 1175-76 & nn.96-98.
11. See OHIO GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 74. On the streets, attorneys call
this well-known tactic "starving her out." See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 161-62; Florida
Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at 810; Missouri Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at 535. As
Winner notes:
In divorce court, some lawyers use so-called scorched earth tactics against wives in a
campaign to wear them down and starve them out. They attempt to outspend the wife
by legally obstructing the proceedings and delaying an agreement until she finally runs
out of money and patience and gives up.
WINNER, supra note 9, at 58. Cases challenging settlement agreements frequently reflect the
circumstances that Winner describes and that courts largely ignore. See generally Bryan, supra
note 3, at 1243-70; Penelope E. Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The Lawyer's Role in
Divorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L.Q. 177, 177-88 (1994).
12 See WINNER, supra note 9, at xix, 17; Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at 809.
13. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 192; OHIO GENDER
BIAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 72-73 (1995); WINNER, supra note 9, at 40-41; Bryan, supra note
3, at 1178; Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at 810.
14. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 157-58, 193. Husbands
generally control the marital financial resources and sometimes conceal assets. See, e.g., FINAL
REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER ISSUES IN THE
COURTS 58 (1989) [hereinafter MICHIGAN GENDER BIAS REPORT]; PATRICIA PHILLIPS,
DIVORCE: A WOMAN'S GUIDE TO GETING A FAIR SHARE 94, 101-09 (1995). Others
deliberately misrepresent the value of marital assets. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS
REPORT, supra note 2, at 22-23; WINNER, supra note 9, at 64-65. If the wife cannot afford
discovery, she will lack the information she needs to negotiate effectively and to assess the
fairness of a settlement offer. See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 2,
at 22-23; Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at 810; Marygold S. Melli et al., The Process
of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1133, 1146-47 (1988). Courts frequently exacerbate the wife's discovery problems by
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of her case, then, suffers. 15
If the wife does have sufficient funds to retain a lawyer
throughout and to prepare her case adequately, her lawyer may
represent her interests poorly.16  Many lawyers retain sexually
discriminatory attitudes toward women.', They also frequently
encourage their women clients to accept poor settlements. 18 Even if
the lawyer apprehends her client's financial vulnerability and
prepares the case well, a biased and/or incompetent judge may
undermine the lawyer's efforts. 19 A wife also may prove vulnerable to
her husband's threat to pursue custody if she does not accept his
inadequate financial proposal.20 For good reason, battered wives are
refusing to enforce her discovery requests. See MASSACHUSETrS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra
note 2, at 22-23; Missouri Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at 531.
15. See WISCONSIN EQUAL JUSTICE TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT 237-38 (1991)
[hereinafter WISCONSIN GENDER BIAS REPORT]; Bryan, supra note 3, at 1177-78; Missouri
Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at 528-30.
16. See Bryan, supra note 3, at 1234-38 & nn.378-403; Linda D. Elrod et al., A Review of the
Year in Family Law: Children's Issues Dominate, 32 FAM. L.Q. 661, 676 (1999). For a scathing
portrayal of how lawyers represent wives, see generally WINNER, supra note 9.
17. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 145, 165; PHYLLIS
CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATTLE FOR CHILDREN AND CUSTODY 198-208 (1987)
(describing lawyer gender bias against women in custody cases); Bryan, supra note 11, at 177-88
(revealing the gender bias of a woman lawyer against her woman divorce client); Catherine F.
Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State
Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 814 (1993) (noting that many lawyers
disbelieve women's allegations of domestic violence or consider the violence insignificant);
Isabel Marcus, Locked In and Locked Out: Reflections on the History of Divorce Law Reform in
New York State, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 375, 462-64, 467 n.342 (1989) (noting that divorce settlements
negotiated by lawyers reflected the same gendered decisionmaking found in judicial decisions).
18. See WINNER, supra note 9, at 69, 91; Bryan, supra note 3, at 1237; see also Melli et al.,
supra note 14, at 1158-59; Joan M. Krauskopf, A Pilot Study on Marital Power as an Influence in
Division of Pension Benefits at Divorce of Long Term Marriages, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 169, 184-
85 (discussing the variability in attorney representation).
19. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 119-21, 140-43, 161;
CONNECTICUT TASK FORCE ON GENDER, JUSTICE AND THE COURTS 124 (1991) [hereinafter
CONNECTICUT GENDER BIAS REPORT] (noting that one Connecticut judge refuses to award
alimony because he believes that women should be married and an alimony award may
encourage women not to remarry); MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 2, at
35-36; Bryan, supra note 3, at 1195-98 & nn.194-209, 1213-16 & nn.270-74, 285-86, 288, 1226-33
& nn.335, 337-38, 346, 348-49, 353-58; Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory
of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227,2273-75 (1994).
20. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 25 (noting that in
divorce mediation women bargain away their economic rights in order to retain custody of the
children); OHIO GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 80-81 (finding that 83% of surveyed
attorneys believed that fathers seek custody for negotiation leverage on financial issues); Scott
Altman, Lurking in the Shadow, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 493, 496-504 (1995); Mary E. Becker,
Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support Systems, Custody Outcomes,
and Liability for Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 13, 28-29 (1995) [hereinafter
Becker, Double Binds]; Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1
REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 138 (1992) [hereinafter Becker, Maternal Feelings]; Bryan,
supra note 3, at 1178-79; Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and
Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727, 761 (1988); Florida
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particularly threatened by this tactic.21
Formal divorce laws also enhance the wife's problems. For
instance, indeterminate spousal maintenance 22  and property
distribution 23 laws fail to provide wives with firm legal entitlements,
making it difficult for them to secure fair settlements or judicial
Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at 819-901; Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent
Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168 (1984); Jana B.
Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1550; Barbara Stark, Guys
and Dolls: Remedial Nurturing Skills in Post-Divorce Practice, Feminist Theory, and Family Law
Doctrine, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 293, 336 n.177 (1997); Heather Ruth Wishik, Economics of
Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79, 101 (1986) (finding that a significant number
of interviewed women admitted bargaining away property or support rights in return for child
custody). To curb this practice, Altman suggests that a rule should require parties to submit
settlement agreements in stages. A court should refuse to accept any financial agreement until
sometime after it has approved the custody/visitation agreement. Once approved by the court,
the custody/visitation agreement becomes nonmodifiable. Even if one party agreed to financial
terms in order to protect custody, that party could change their mind in the time between court
approval of the custody/visitation agreement and court acceptance of the financial agreement.
Attorneys would advise their clients not to actually enter financial agreements until the court
had approved the custody/visitation agreement. See Altman, supra, at 527-29.
21. See, e.g., Bryan, supra note 3, at 1225-34 & nn.329-77 (describing the severe
disadvantages facing battered women in contested custody cases); see also CHESLER, supra note
17, at 79 tbl.6 (finding that 59% of fathers in her study who won custody in litigation had abused
their wives, and that 50% of the fathers who obtained custody through private negotiations had
abused their wives); Becker, Double Binds, supra note 20; Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of
Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence in Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 1041 (1991); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 44 n.199 (1991) (discussing studies confirming high
percentages of custody awards to fathers who battered their wives).
22. Illinois law, for example, provides that a court
may grant maintenance only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance lacks
sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to her, to provide for her
reasonable needs; is unable to support herself through appropriate employment; or is
otherwise without sufficient income. Maintenance is to be awarded in such amounts
and for such periods of time as the court deems just, after consideration of various
factors, including the following: the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or
training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment; the
standard of living established during the marriage; the age and the physical and
emotional condition of both parties; and the ability of the spouse from whom
maintenance is sought to meet his or her needs while meeting those of the spouse
seeking maintenance.
In re Marriage of Harding, 545 N.E.2d 459, 469 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (citations omitted); see also
In re Marriage of Frederick, 578 N.E.2d 612, 620 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding that a court also
should consider the tax consequences to each party of a maintenance award); MICHIGAN
GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 14, at 52-53 (reporting similar criteria in Michigan).
23. Illinois law, for example, directs courts to consider
each spouse's contribution to or dissipation of the marital property, the value of the
property set apart to each spouse; the duration of the marriage; the relative economic
circumstances of the parties; the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources
of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the
parties; the custodial provisions for any children; whether the apportionment is in lieu
of or in addition to maintenance; the opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition
of capital assets and income; and the tax consequences of the property division upon
the respective economic circumstances of the parties.
In re Marriage of Harding, 545 N.E.2d at 465.
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decrees.24 When a wife does obtain spousal maintenance, the award
likely will be insufficient in amount and duration25 and frequently the
husband refuses to pay.26 Moreover, property distribution laws still
fail to capture as property the husband's post-divorce income stream 27
or his enhanced earning capacity,28 many times the most significant, 29
or only, marital asset.30 Typically, wives continue to receive fewer of
the marital assets than do their husbands.31
24. See Bryan, supra note 3, at 1212-19; Smith, supra note 2, at 137 (noting that every study
of divorce concludes that distribution of marital property inadequately responds to the harsh
economic consequences of divorce for women and children). Community property laws provide
no better outcomes for women than equitable distribution regimes. See Smith, supra note 2, at
136. The American Law Institute (the "ALl") has proposed more determinate property
distribution laws; more specifically, an equal distribution of marital property, see PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION § 4.15 (Proposed
Final Draft 1997), as well as more determinate spousal maintenance laws. While I favor the
move toward determinacy, I disagree with the proposed equal distribution of marital property.
The ALI's classification of property and its maintenance provisions prove problematic and
insensitive to women's concerns. A feminist critique of the ALI's recommendations, however,
is beyond the scope of this Essay.
25. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 138-39; MICHIGAN GENDER
BIAS REPORT, supra note 14, at 53-55; OREGON GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 9, at 52;
Bryan, supra note 3, at 1201-04 & nn.226-33. The unavailability of maintenance likely strikes
Black women harder than white women because fewer Black men than white men earn incomes
that make maintenance awards feasible. See Twila L. Perry, Race Matters: Change, Choice, and
Family Law at the Millennium, 33 FAM. L.Q. 461, 465 (1999).
26. See CONNECTICLT GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 19, at 144-45; MASSACHUSETTS
GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 31 (noting 1981 nationwide statistics that indicate that
only 43% of women awarded maintenance received full payment and that 33% of women
awarded maintenance received no payment at all); MICHIGAN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra
note 14, at 55.
27. See Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at 818.
2& See MICHIGAN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 14, at 56; ARENDELL, supra note 2,
at 131-32; Deborah A. Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity in "Enhanced Spouse/Other
Spouse" Divorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 751, 751-53, 757 (1988); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and
Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2361-62 (1994); Smith,
supra note 2, at 144-45.
29. See MICHIGAN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 14, at 56; see also Garrison,
Equitable Distribution in New York, supra note 2, at 663-64 (finding that the low value of
marital property found in her study contrasted dramatically with the high value of family
income); Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 383, 384
(1994) (noting that the human capital of the husband represents the chief asset of most
divorcing couples).
30. See SHIRLEY P. BURGGRAF, THE FEMININE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC MAN:
REVIVING THE ROLE OF FAMILY IN THE POST-INDUSTRIAL AGE 125-26 (1997); WEITZMAN,
supra note 2, at 110-11, 388 (noting that failure to include "career assets" in the marital estate
skews the property distribution in favor of the primary working spouse and assures an
inequitable division of marital property); Smith, supra note 2, at 145.
31. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-36; OREGON
GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 9, at 52-53; Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at 816-
18; Marcus, supra note 17, at 462-67 & n.342 (finding that appellate cases reveal that wives
receive fewer marital assets than do husbands and that settlements reflect this pattern); Lynn
Hecht Schafran, Gender and Justice: Florida and the Nation, 42 FLA. L. REV. 181, 188 (1990);
Krauskopf, supra note 18, at 183, 186, 188. Williams argues that the unspoken "he who earns it
owns it" rule governs property distribution in equitable distribution states. Williams, supra note
[Vol. 75:713
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The rhetoric surrounding divorce enhances a wife's financial
vulnerability. For instance, the law now favors a clean financial break
between divorced spouses, 2 supporting the judicial reluctance to
award spousal maintenance.3 3 If judges do not award spousal
maintenance, the wife's lawyer also may have difficulty obtaining
maintenance in negotiations. She cannot, for instance, credibly
threaten that she will litigate the issue of maintenance if the other
side proves unreasonable, when all involved know of the judicial
reluctance to award maintenance. 34
19, at 2251. Ellman notes that some equitable distribution states employ a presumption in favor
of the equal division of marital property, but that in practice wives still receive less than one-half
of the marital assets. See IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS
234 (2d ed. 1991); see also WINNER, supra note 9, at 41-42.
32. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Property Distribution Physics: The Talisman of Time and
Middle Class Law, 31 FAM. L.Q. 93, 107 & n.76 (1997); Garrison, Equitable Distribution in New
York, supra note 2, at 623, 629; Regan, supra note 28, at 2314-15 & n.39; Williams, supra note
19, at 2232-33. Courts use this rationale to disfavor maintenance even when spouses
undoubtedly will remain related because they share children. Moreover, the implicit
contradiction between conceptualizing ex-spouses as strangers for purposes of financial issues
and simultaneously demanding that ex-spouses remain cooperative parents generally lacks
acknowledgement in the law. Scott suggests that the "clean break" policy also may discourage
some parents from supporting their children after divorce. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational
Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 36 (1990).
33. In the words of one judge:
Alimony was never intended to assure a perpetual state of secured indolence. It
should not be suffered to convert a host of physically and mentally competent young
women into an army of alimony drones, who neither toil nor spin, and become a drain
on society and a menace to themselves.
Samuel H. Hofstadter & Shirley R. Levittan, Alimony-A Reformulation, 7 J. FAM. L. 51, 55
(1967). As Weitzman notes, judges typically view the husband's income as rightfully his. See
WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 163, 183; see also Jana B. Singer, Husbands, Wives, and Human
Capital: Why the Shoe Won't Fit, 31 FAM. L.Q. 119, 124 (1997); Williams, supra note 19, at 2234,
2250-52. This judicial attitude persists despite statutory provisions that encourage consideration
of the wife's contributions as homemaker. See Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and
the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 748 & n.93, 749-54 (1993); Cynthia
Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership
Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 95-96 (1993); see also Bryan,
supra note 3, at 1201-04 & nn.227-33 (discussing studies supporting the infrequency and
inadequacy of maintenance awards).
34. Anticipation of what the court will do is a bargaining chip in negotiation. See Marc
Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. -LEGAL EDUC.
268, 268-69 (1984). As one lawyer stated to his male divorce client:
We ought not to be offering too much. Precedent seems to be more generous than
judges are in paying spousal support. As much as you are concerned right now about
what she might be getting, the judges are really not generous at all. This is a somewhat
conservative county and there's a backlash for a woman to go out and do whatever a
man can. So why not? Why can't she go and take care of herself? You take care of
yourself.
AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS:
POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 125 (1995); see also Melli et al., supra note 14,
at 1143-44. See Bryan, supra note 3, at 1201-15, for a more thorough discussion of the
difficulties wives encounter when they seek spousal maintenance.
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The ideology of formal equality35 currently pervades divorce law
and ignores the wife's financial dependence upon her husband that
stems from her marginal workforce participation 36  and her
responsibilities for family care.37 Encouraged to perceive wives as the
formal equals of their husbands,3 8 judges and lawyers fashion
outcomes that fail to address the wife's financial needs at divorce. 39
35. Bartlett and Harris explain formal equality as follows:
Formal equality is a principle of equal treatment: individuals who are alike should be
treated alike, according to their actual characteristics rather than stereotypical
assumptions made about them. It is a principle that can be applied either to a single
individual, whose right to be treated on his or her own merits can be viewed as a right
of individual autonomy, or to a group whose members seek the same treatment as
members of other, similarly situated groups. What makes an issue one of formal
equality is that the claim is limited to treatment in relation to another, similarly
situated individual or group and does not extend beyond same-treatment claims to any
demands for some particular, substantive treatment.
GENDER AND THE LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 101 (Katherine T. Bartlett &
Angela P. Harris eds., 2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter GENDER AND THE LAW].
36. Marriage may severely compromise a wife's ability to participate in the labor market.
Wives tend to subordinate their careers to those of their husbands and to assume the bulk of
homemaking and childcare responsibilities. See Williams, supra note 19, at 2245-47 & n.91.
Williams describes how wives tend to sacrifice their own market participation in order to
facilitate the ideal worker status of their husbands. See id. at 2236-67. Wives also lose income
for each year they remain out of the workforce. Williams notes that wives who interrupt their
careers lose an average of 1.5% of income for each year they do not participate in market labor,
with college-educated wives losing as much as 4.3%. See id. at 2257 & n.148 (citing Jacob
Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of Women, in
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 397 (Theodore W. Schultz ed., 1974); see also Elizabeth Smith
Beninger & Jeanne Wielage Smith, Career Opportunity Cost: A Factor in Spousal Support
Determination, 16 FAM. L.Q. 201, 207 (1982); Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family
Investment in Human Capital: Earnings of Women, 82 J. POL. ECON. 576, 583 (1974).
Moreover, the wife's market work during marriage has little to no effect on her financial well
being after divorce. See Pamela J. Smock, The Economic Costs of Marital Disruption for Young
Women over the Past Two Decades, 30 DEMOGRAPHY 353, 367 (1993). Unless the wife
remarries, she will suffer long-term economic costs attributable to divorce. See id. at 366-67; see
also Williams, supra note 19, at 2256-57 (1994) (noting that a mother's decreased earning
capacity due to child care responsibilities extends beyond the children's majority).
37. See Bryan, supra note 3, at 1206-09 & nn.239-51 (1999); Slaughter, supra note 6, at 73,
78-82. Williams explains that even in two career families, couples commonly engage in a game
of "chicken" over who will provide housekeeping and childcare services. Due to her
socialization that accords high priority to homemaking and childcare, the wife typically loses this
game and performs most of these functions. See Williams, supra note 19, at 2240-41.
38. Williams explains that the current ideal in family law is the self-reliance of all adults.
See id. at 2232. Estin argues that many courts refuse to award caregivers maintenance in order
to encourage self-reliance. See Estin, supra note 33, at 721-22, 728-30.
39. See, e.g., CoNNEcTicuT GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 19, at 137; OHIO GENDER
BIAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 72; Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at 814-16; Missouri
Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at 546-50 (reporting that many attorneys believe that many
judges have an unrealistic view of the dependent spouse's ability to become self-sufficient);
Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony: The Division of
Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 827, 854-57, 861-64 (1988) (observing that
courts rarely distribute property to address financial need, despite statutory authorization to do
so). Stark argues that family law's expectation that the "unitary family" will continue to operate
in its traditional manner after divorce places inordinate burdens on women. See Stark, supra
note 20, at 312. She explains:
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Mothers still tend to have physical custody of the children after
divorce.4° All states require noncustodial parents to pay custodial
parents child support in accordance with statutory guidelines. 41 The
amount of child support prescribed by such guidelines does not cover
the true costs of raising a child.42 Guidelines also link the amount of
child support to the custodial arrangement, 43 decreasing the amount
the mother receives if the children spend a minimum number of
overnights with the father.44 Fathers typically bargain for more
The story of the unitary family imposes similarly impractical responsibilities on the
mother at divorce. She is supposed to continue as caregiver, although her task is much
more complicated, and she typically receives much less support.... Many divorced
women do not trust their former husbands with their children. At visitation, the
divorced mother is required to relinquish control over her children to a man she may
no longer trust at a time when the children are most at risk. Moreover, this temporary
relinquishment rarely provides the mother with any real respite. Because she usually
retains primary custodial responsibility, it is left to her to deal with the logistics, as well
as the consequences, of visitation. Even so, mothers report that the major problem
with visitation by fathers is that fathers do not visit as often as mothers would like
them to. The post-divorce mother is also expected to continue as household manager
while taking a substantial cut in her budget.... The practical demands of maintaining a
household on a reduced budget force women to assume greater bread-winning
responsibilities than ever before. Six months or a year of what is euphemistically
known as "rehabilitative alimony" rarely enables her to overcome the "sticky floor" as
well as the "glass ceiling" of workplace discrimination.
Id. at 312-13. Divorce, of course, is not the only context in which courts use formal equality to
produce unequal financial results for women. See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual
Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1282 (1987).
40. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 121; CONNECTICUT GENDER
BIAS REPORT, supra note 19, at 128; MICHIGAN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 14, at 49-
50.
41. See Jane C. Venohr & Robert G. Williams, The Implementation and Periodic Review of
State Child Support Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 7, 7 (1999); Laura W. Morgan & Mark C. Lino, A
Comparison of Child Support Awards Calculated Under States' Child Support Guidelines with
Expenditures on Children Calculated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 33 FAM. L.Q. 191,
191-92 (1999).
42. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 123, 126-27, 128-31;
MICHIGAN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 14, at 59-60; Marsha Garrison, Child Support
and Children's Poverty, 28 FAM. L.Q. 475, 479 (1994) (reviewing ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN
W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT (1993), and DONALD J.
HERNANDEZ, AMERICA'S CHILDREN: RESOURCES FROM FAMILY, GOVERNMENT AND THE
ECONOMY (1993)); Morgan & Lino, supra note 41, at 204, 214-18 & Graph IV-VI (1999); see
also Garrison, Child Support Policy, supra note 2, at 159-61 (finding that guidelines continue to
produce awards that result in a lower standard of living for the child and a higher standard of
living for the noncustodial obligor parent). But see R. Mark Rogers, Wisconsin-Style and
Income Shares Child Support Guidelines: Excessive Burdens and Flawed Economic Foundation,
33 FAM. L.Q. 135 (1999).
43. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 133-34; Marygold S.
Melli, Guideline Review: Child Support and Time Sharing by Parents, 33 FAM. L.Q. 219, 224-25
(1999); Venohr & Williams, supra note 41, at 21, 32-33.
44. The California child support statute, for instance, authorizes courts to reduce the child
support award if the noncustodial parent has 30% or more custodial or visitation time. See
CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 33; see also Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers
and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality. 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1446-48 (1991)
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custody in order to reduce their child support obligation. 45
Subsequently, many fathers allow the children to spend most of their
time with their mothers, 46 leaving her with even less child support
than the guidelines would allow under the new custody situation.47
Some custodial mothers do not obtain child support, and even
more cannot collect what fathers owe. 48 Enforcement procedures
remain notoriously ineffective, despite state and federal efforts to
combat noncompliance. 49 Nearly all guidelines fail to provide support
for college education, 0 leaving only the custodial mother to provide
whatever financial assistance she can to her children. 51
(discussing similar provisions in the states of Colorado and Washington). Moreover, many child
support statutes assume that the noncustodial parent visits 20% of the time, but provide for no
upward adjustment in child support if that amount of visitation does not occur. See id. at 1448-
49.
45. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 133-35; OHIO GENDER
BIAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 80-81; Altman, supra note 20, at 502-03.
46. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 134-35; see also Melli, supra
note 43, at 229 (recognizing this possibility but claiming the possibility lacks empirical
verification).
47. See Czapanskiy, supra note 44, at 1447-48. The mother could, of course, petition to
modify child support. Financial constraints, however, prevent many mothers from doing so. See
CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 135.
48. See id. at 133, 136; CONNECTICUT GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 19, at 143;
MICHIGAN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 14, at 50, 60; OREGON GENDER BIAS REPORT,
supra note 9, at 47, 51-52; David L. Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the Virtues and
Perils of Child-Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2588-89 (1995); Ronald K. Henry,
Child Support at a Crossroads: When the Real World Intrudes upon Academics and Advocates,
33 FAM. L.Q. 235, 238 (1999); Paula G. Roberts, Child Support Orders: Problems with
Enforcement, in 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN AND DIVORCE 101, 110 (1994).
49. See generally Henry, supra note 48, at 237, 239, 246-47. Fathers' refusals to support
their children have caused states problems for nearly 100 years. In the early twentieth century,
for instance, states passed legislation that criminalized desertion and nonsupport. See MARY
ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD
CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 94-95 (1994). Then, as now, however, these laws largely
proved ineffective at providing children with needed funds, and courts sent few deserting fathers
to jail. See id. at 95-96. Mason argues that poor mothers likely would have fared better without
these tougher laws. Widows became almost the exclusive recipients of mother's pensions,
because the toughened laws encouraged the belief that deserting fathers, not the state, should
provide for their families. See id. at 96. Rather than provide aid to deserted mothers and their
children, state agencies unsuccessfully pursued the deserting father. See id. By the mid-1930s,
courts no longer proved reluctant to jail deserting, nonsupporting fathers. See id. at 115.
Judges, however, responded ambivalently to a divorced father's obligation to support his
children over whom he no longer had custody. Some courts reasoned that the father's
obligation to support his children arose from the father's right to complete custody and control
of the children. If the father no longer had this right to custody, perhaps, he also should no
longer have the obligation of support. See id. at 115-16. Most courts, however, created new
rationales to justify a father's continuing obligation to support children over whom he had lost
custody at divorce. See id. at 116. Some courts found that "divine law" supported the father's
obligation; others reasoned that fathers could fulfill the duty of support better than mothers.
See id.
50. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 131-32.
51. Most of the youngsters in Wallerstein and Blakeslee's study came from middle-class
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While most mothers still receive physical custody of the
children,5 2 gender bias reports and empirical research challenge the
myth that divorcing mothers always receive custody of their
children.53 Rather, when fathers actually pursue custody of the
children, they more likely than not will succeed.54 This insight should
not be shocking. Custody law has changed dramatically over the past
forty years, becoming increasingly hostile to mothers.55
A wave of progressive reform during the early 1900s ended in the
families where one or both parents had college degrees, where most of the children attended
high schools, and where 85% of all students went to college. Yet, at ten-year follow-up
interviews, only one-half of the divorced children were attending or had completed a two-year
or four-year college. One-third of them, including many highly intelligent children, had
dropped out of high school or college. Of the children attending college, only one in ten
received full financial support from one or both parents. Others received no help at all or only
limited financial help-even from wealthy fathers who could afford to help much more. Among
the fathers in the study who could afford to help with college expenses, only one-third assisted
their children. Two-thirds provided no help. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA
BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN & CHILDREN: A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 25,
44 (1989); WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 353; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Towards a
Revitalization of Family Law, 69 TEX. L. REV. 245, 269 (1990) (reviewing MARY ANN
GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW AND FAMILY IN THE
UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989)); Barbara Grissett & L. Allen Furr, Effects of
Parental Divorce on Children's Financial Support for College, 22 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE
155, 159-61 (1994) (finding that divorced children attending college received significantly less
parental financial support than children from intact families and that the custodial parent likely
provided whatever support they did receive).
52. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 121; CONNECTICUT
GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 19, at 128; MICHIGAN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note
14, at 49-50.
53. See MICHIGAN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 14, at 63; OHIO GENDER BIAS
REPORT, supra note 8, at 81.
54. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 59, 62-63 (noting that
when Massachusetts fathers seek custody they obtain either primary or joint physical custody in
more than 70% of the cases); WISCONSIN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 15, at 197 (noting
that judges reported that they "about equally" awarded custody to men and women in contested
custody cases); Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at 821-22 & n.101; Nancy D. Polikoff,
Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235, 236-37 (1982); see also CHESLER, supra note 17, at 80 tbl.5 (finding
that in 70% of disputed custody cases fathers won custody); Id. at 66 (noting that many studies,
including her own, indicate that fathers who contest custody are more likely than their wives to
win); WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 233 tbl.22; Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of
Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determination at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L.
REv. 107, 120 & n.37; Lenore J. Weitzman & Ruth B. Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal
Standards and Empirical Patterns for Child Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 502-04 (1979) (finding that in 63% of disputed custody cases in Los
Angeles in 1977 fathers won custody). But see Robert H. Mnookin et al., Private Ordering
Revisited: What Custodial Arrangements Are Parents Negotiating?, in DIVORCE REFORM AT
THE CROSSROADS 37, 53 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) (finding that
when mothers' and fathers' requests for custody conflicted, mothers' requests were granted
approximately twice as often as fathers requests). Yet, when both parents requested sole
custody, mothers received what they requested in only 46.2% of the cases. See id. at 54 tbl.2.6.




1930s with most states granting mothers custody rights equal to those
of fathers.56 The courts used their discretion in applying these new
custody laws, premised upon the best interests of the children, to
create a presumption that mothers should receive custody of children
of tender years.57  By the latter third of the twentieth century,
however, new custody reforms began to once again shift the balance
of power between mothers and fathers.58 The rhetoric of formal
equality invaded the custody as well as the financial realm of
divorce. 59  Fathers demanded equal consideration as custodial
parents, despite their minimal child care responsibilities during the
marriage. The Tender Years Presumption itself fell to political
pressures and equal protection challenges, 6° leaving behind only the
vague and indeterminate "best interests" standard. 61 State courts and
legislatures also developed other principles to guide a best interests
determination that have proven detrimental to mothers. 62
Presumptions in favor of joint legal and/or physical custody, friendly
56. By 1936, 42 states had legislation recognizing that mothers had rights equal to those of
fathers to the custody and control of their children. See id. at 114. Prior to this time, the father's
common law right to custody and control over his children prevailed. See id. at 6, 59-61, 114.
57. At the start of the nineteenth century, American courts began to recognize a mother's
special capacity to care for young children and sometimes would favor the mother's natural
right over the father's common law right to custody of the child. See id. at 60-61. Eventually the
"Tender Years Doctrine" prevailed and courts more routinely awarded custody of infants and
young children to mothers. See id. at 61; see also Czapanskiy, supra note 44, at 1423-24.
Exceptions, however, existed. Courts seemed to favor placing older children with the same-sex
parent and the relative wealth of the mother and father influenced courts. See MASON, supra
note 49, at 62. Moreover, the nineteenth-century presumption of a mother's superior moral
character quickly crumbled at any sign of immoral behavior. See id. at 63. Courts considered
the mother's adultery and/or the mother's leaving the father without "just cause" particularly
reprehensible. See id. at 63-64.
58. MASON, supra note 49, at 121-22.
59. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 20, at 758-59. MacKinnon warns that the law "actively
engages in sex inequality by apparently prohibiting abuses it largely permits, like rape, and by
hiding the deprivations it imposes beneath ostensibly gender-neutral terms, like abortion."
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1300
(1991). That laws operate similarly in the divorce arena should not surprise.
60. See Stark, supra note 20, at 307 & n.49; Marygold S. Melli et al., Child Custody in a
Changing World: A Study of Postdivorce Arrangements in Wisconsin, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 773,
776. Fineman argues that egalitarian ideology has helped to neuter motherhood by devaluing
and making invisible the caretaking function that mothers typically perform. See MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 68 (1995); see also Estin, supra note 33, at 721-22, 728-30.
61. See MASON, supra note 49, at 122; see also Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at
168-69; Stark, supra note 20, at 307. West Virginia adopted the primary caretaker standard, and
Minnesota experimented with it. All other states have their own version of the best interests
standard. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 138. In recent years, however, both
Minnesota and West Virginia have abandoned the primary caretaker standard.
62. Becker also criticizes the many jurisdictions that give weight to children's preferences
regarding custody arrangements. See id. at 188-90.
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parent provisions, and the assumption that all divorced children will
fare best if they have frequent and continuing contact with both
parents all disadvantage mothers,63 despite their gender neutral
language. Effective use of formal equality rhetoric and political
pressure by fathers' rights groups64 have produced custody law that
places fathers on better than equal legal footing with mothers65 and
fails to honor the caretaking mothers typically provide for their
children.
The vague and indeterminate best interests standard
disadvantages mothers because it grants trial courts tremendous
discretion while providing little guidance.66 Trial courts, then, can
discriminate against mothers with impunity. 67 Unsurprisingly, trial
63. See John DeWitt Gregory, Interdependency Theory-Old Sausage in a New Casing: A
Response to Professor Czapanskiy, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037, 1042-43 (1999).
64. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 20, at 758-59; John J. Sampson, Bringing the Courts to
Heel: Substituting Legislative Policy for Judicial Discretion, 33 FAM. L.Q. 565, 568-69 (1999)
(describing the lobbying efforts of fathers' rights groups in Texas for a joint custody statute).
But see id. at 569-70 (describing how a woman's effort succeeded where fathers' rights groups
had failed in securing the needed political support for a Texas joint custody statute).
65. See Fineman, supra note 20, at 739; Polikoff, supra note 54, at 240.
66. See David N. Bolocofsky, Use and Abuse of Mental Health Experts in Child Custody
Determinations, 7 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 197, 203 (1989) (explaining that in a survey of lawyers,
judges, and mental health professions, over 70% thought the best interests standard was
unclear); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce,
83 MIcH. L. REV. 477 (1984); see also Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the
Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 1523,
1533 (1994); Gregory, supra note 63, at 1040-41; Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 955 (1979);
Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975).
67. See, e.g., CHESLER, supra note 17, at 210-34; MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT,
supra note 2, at 62-66, 69-73; GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE REPORT OF SOUTH DAKOTA 4 (1994)
(finding that those surveyed perceived gender bias against women as most prevalent in four
areas: rape, custody, sentencing, and child support); WINNER, supra note 9, at 46-49; Becker,
Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 138, 175-83; Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at
819-23; Christopher P. Gilkerson, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought
and Action: Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and
Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 880-81 (1992); Susan Beth Jacobs, Note &
Comment, The Hidden Gender Bias Behind "The Best Interest of the Child" Standard in Custody
Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 845, 868 (1997); Linda R. Keenan, Note, Domestic Violence
and Custody Litigation: The Need for Statutory Reform, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407, 412 (1985).
Martha Fineman argues that patriarchal ideology remains the most determinative factor in the
creation and acceptance of the discourses pertaining to motherhood in our society. See Martha
A. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourse, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY
AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 205, 207,217-22 (Martha Albertson Fineman
& Isabel Karpin eds., 1995). Under patriarchal ideology the dominant family form consists of a
male-headed reproductive unit with defined gender role divisions. Motherhood remains a
colonized concept-an event women live but men occupy and define, and to which men give
content and value. See id. at 217. Can we wonder, then, why judges, still mostly men, use their
patriarchal assumptions about motherhood, that seem discriminatory to mothers, in determining
custody? Fineman also argues, and I agree, that single motherhood challenges and threatens
the grip of patriarchal ideology. See id. at 217-18. Might we not then expect judicial hostility
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courts hold mothers to higher moral68 and parenting standards than
fathers.69 Courts also sometimes punish a mother who has limited
financial resources.70 Yet if the mother works outside the home,
courts perceive her work as in conflict with the children's best
interests.71  In contrast, judges see the father's employment as
beneficial to the children.72 Courts credit the father's higher income
and his ability to provide a more stable environment, while ignoring
that the instability of the mother's home necessarily results from the
towards women who seek to become single mothers through divorce? Fineman further notes
that "paradigmatic intimate associational bond" under patriarchal ideology remains the sexual
affiliation between man and woman, id. at 217, and that traditionally this bond is realized
through marriage. See id. at 218. She acknowledges that "[d]eviance from this paradigm has
brought with it social and occasionally legal sanctions, as well as the potential for condemnation
in the discourses of psychology, social work, and medicine." Id.; see also FINEMAN, supra note
60, at 101-44. Perhaps, then, we can better understand the growing hostility of all divorce laws
to women who break this paradigm by divorcing. Perhaps current divorce laws also are
designed to force women to re-affiliate with men for survival and protection, ultimately
reinforcing this paradigm.
6& See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 65; MICHIGAN GENDER
BIAS REPORT, supra note 14, at 63; Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 175-77
(explaining how many courts find a mother's sexual activity outside marriage inconsistent with
her children's best interests); Jacobs, supra note 67, at 857-58; Schafran, supra note 31, at 192.
This attitude has historical roots. In nineteenth-century America, the mother's presumed
superior moral character and her capacity to care for young children led to the adoption of the
Tender Years Presumption. See MASON, supra note 49, at 60-61. If a mother, however,
behaved inconsistently with the expectation of her superior morality, courts routinely deprived
her of custody. Frequently courts denied adulterous mothers visitation with their children as
well as support from their ex-husbands. See id. at 63-64. In contrast, courts would deny a father
custody of his children only for clear abuse, usually physical, of the mother and child, or for
desertion and non-support. See id. at 64. Courts usually did not consider a father's adultery
sufficiently immoral to deprive the father of custody. See id. By the mid-1930s, however, many
judges seemed less willing to impose this double standard of morality upon mothers. See id. at
113.
69. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 63-64; Florida Gender
Bias Report, supra note 9, at 822; Jacobs, supra note 67, at 857, 867-68, 887; Schafran, supra note
31, at 192.
70. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 148; MICHIGAN GENDER
BIAS REPORT, supra note 14, at 63; Jacobs, supra note 67, at 858-61, 883-84.
71. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 148; DOWD, supra note
6, at 6-8; MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 63; MICHIGAN GENDER
BIAS REPORT, supra note 14, at 63; WINNER, supra note 9, at 46-47; Becker, Maternal Feelings,
supra note 20, at 177 & nn.171-72; Jacobs, supra note 67, at 863-65, 868-71, 890; Polikoff, supra
note 54, at 237-39; Carol Sanger, Mother from Child: Perspectives on Separation and
Abandonment, in MOTHERS IN LAW, supra note 67, at 27, 39-40; Stark, supra note 20, at 342.
This judicial attitude seems rooted in early-twentieth-century perceptions of motherhood.
During the early 1900s, states limited financial aid to single mothers to those who proved
"worthy." A "worthy" mother devoted full time to her children, did not work outside the home,
and lived a life of conspicuous virtue without male companionship. See MASON, supra note 49,
at 93.
72. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 177 & n.172; Jacobs, supra note 67, at
857; Polikoff, supra note 54, at 237-39; see also MICHIGAN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note
14, at 63 (noting that judges sometimes perceive mothers who emphasize their careers more
negatively than fathers who emphasize their careers).
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divorce.73 Courts change custody from mothers to remarried fathers,
particularly if their new wives are homemakers.7 4 In so doing, they
ignore the extremely difficult nature of stepparent relationships, 75
believing rather that mothers are fungible. 76 Negative stereotypes
about women encourage trial judges to disbelieve or minimize
women's allegations of abuse against them and/or their children. 77
Judges sometimes deprive battered women of custody when they flee
the marital home without the children. 78 Judges have reasoned that
the mother has abandoned the children,79 proving her parental
unfitness.
Appellate review provides little control against judicial abuse
because appellate courts will not overturn a trial court custody
determination absent an abuse of discretion. 0 Moreover, appellate
courts have difficulty determining when a trial court has
impermissibly deviated from the law because of the indeterminacy of
the best interests standard. Finally, when appellate courts do find an
abuse of discretion, typically they remand the case to the same biased
trial judge, who then can draw on a variety of acceptable rationales to
support his/her prior decision. Wide discretion and little oversight
73. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 178.
74. See id. at 181.
75. See, e.g., Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman & Kay Pasley, Stepfamilies in 1984 and Today-A
Scholarly Perspective, 26 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 19, 22-23, 26-27, 30-32 (1997) (reviewing
research on stepfamilies); Marilyn Coleman & Lawrence H. Ganong, Stepfamilies from the
Step/amily's Perspective, 26 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 107 (1997); Jean Giles-Sims, Current
Knowledge About Child Abuse in Stepfamilies, 26 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 215 (1997)
(discussing research that indicates a higher risk of child physical and sexual abuse in stepfamilies
than in natal families). Many of the problems confronting stepfamilies appear most intense in
stepmother/stepchild relationships. See Ihinger-Tailman & Pasley, supra, at 22-23; Coleman &
Ganong, supra, at 109-14.
76. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 181; Jacobs, supra note 67, at 857, 871,
890-92.
77. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 150-55 (noting that negative
stereotypes about women encourage judges to disbelieve women's allegations of child sexual
abuse); OHIO GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 81; OREGON GENDER BIAS REPORT,
supra note 9, at 53-54; FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 119-22; Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note
20, at 183 (discussing a North Carolina study finding that allegations of paternal abuse of wives
or children seldom affected judicial custody decisions); Elizabeth Mertz & Kimberly A.
Lonsway, The Power of Denial: Individual and Cultural Constructions of Child Sexual Abuse, 92
NW. U. L. REV. 1415, 1437 (1998) (noting that courts commonly believe that women fabricate
charges of abuse in order to gain an advantage in divorce).
7& See MICHIGAN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 14, at 64, 69.
79. See, e.g., Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and
Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295,
1310 (1993). Carol Sanger argues that our society perceives a mother's separation from her
child, whatever the reason, as abandonment. Sanger, supra note 71, at 27. She also notes that
law often punishes a mother's voluntary separation from her child. See id. at 27, 39.
80. See Jacobs, supra note 67, at 855 & n.85.
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allow judges to use their individual subjective attitudes about women
generally, and mothers specifically, in resolving custody disputes.
Many custody statutes favor the parent who shows the greater
willingness to foster a relationship between the child and the non-
custodial parent.81 Courts use these "friendly parent" provisions82 to
deprive mothers of custody if they allege abuse of themselves or their
children."' Despite evidence to the contrary,84 courts reason that
hysterical and vindictive women make such allegations simply to gain
an advantage in negotiation or at trial.8 Because wife beating often
has occurred in a fractured marriage,86 this judicial attitude severely
disadvantages many divorcing women who seek escape from their
abusers. This judicial misperception also compromises a mother's
ability to protect her children from ongoing abuse by the father.87
Even mothers who only "speak" ill, albeit truthfully, of fathers do so
at their own peril.88
81. See Eleanor E. Maccoby et al., Coparenting in the Second Year After Divorce, 52 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 141, 141 (1990); see also Joanne Schulman & Valerie Pitt, Second Thoughts
on Joint Custody: Analysis of Legislation and Its Implications for Women and Children, 12
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 538, 554-56 (1982) (discussing friendly parent provisions).
82. Friendly parent provisions can create rather perverse situations. One gender bias study
revealed that the wife, advised by her counsel to be "friendly" to the children's father, allowed
her husband frequent contact with the children. At the final divorce hearing, the court granted
the father primary residential custody of the children, reasoning that the mother did not really
want them because she allowed the father to see them so often. See Florida Gender Bias
Report, supra note 9, at 819-23.
83. See Becker, Double Binds, supra note 20, at 26-27; see also Czapanskiy, supra note 9, at
256, 268-69 & n.65.
84. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 151-56 (discussing evidence
regarding mothers' allegations of child sexual abuse during contested custody disputes); Mertz
& Lonsway, supra note 77, at 1454; Jessica Pearson, Ten Myths About Family Law, 27 FAM.
L.Q. 279, 293-95 (1993); see also Meredith Sherman Fahn, Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse in
Custody Disputes, Getting to the Truth of the Matter, 25 FAM. L.Q. 193, 194, 202 (1991).
85. See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 69-70; CALIFORNIA
GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 151 (acknowledging that some judges hold this belief
about mothers who allege child sexual abuse in contested custody disputes); Meier, supra note
79, at 1307-08; Mertz & Lonsway, supra note 77, at 1437, 1453-54 (noting that courts commonly
believe that women fabricate allegations of abuse in order to gain an advantage in divorce).
86. See, e.g., Bryan, supra note 3, at 1219 & n.299; Linda K. Girdner, Custody Mediation in
the United States: Empowerment or Social Control?, 3 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 134, 138 n.19
(1988) (citing a Canadian study that found that 50-75% of divorcing women gave domestic
violence as their reason for marital separation); Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experiences
and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 23, 27-28 (noting that most experts accept that domestic violence has occurred in 50% of
divorce cases); Mahoney, supra note 21, at 10-11, 14; Singer, supra note 20, at 1548.
87. See OREGON GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 9, at 49-50 (noting that mothers
frequently testified that lawyers and judges misunderstood safety issues concerning their
children).
88. Friendly parent provisions reflect an old judicial attitude. For instance, in an 1881 Iowa
case the court took a six-year-old boy away from the mother and gave custody to the father,
because the mother had been "imprudent" in conversations with her son about the father's
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Presumptions in favor of joint custody disadvantage the
caretaking mother and reward the father, despite the father's prior
non-involvement with the child. 89 The mother who seeks sole custody
in a state with a joint custody presumption may seem hostile to the
father and may risk losing custody because of friendly parent
provisions 0  Presumptions in favor of joint custody severely
disadvantage battered mothers who seek custody and visitation
orders that provide protection for them and their children.91
Custody statutes typically assume that divorced children benefit
from frequent contact with both parents.92 This assumption ignores
the social science research suggesting otherwise.93 It also ignores the
negative effect on children of frequent and continuing contact
between highly conflicted parents,94 as well as the negative effect on
proven adultery and the father's criminal conduct. See MASON, supra note 49, at 64.
89. Nancy Illman Meyers, Power (Im)Balance and the Failure of Impartiality in Attorney-
Mediated Divorce, 27 U. TOL. L. REv. 853, 878 (1996).
90. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 170,187.
9L See Sarah M. Buel, Domestic Violence and the Law: An Impassioned Exploration for
Family Peace, 33 FAM L.Q. 719, 732-36 (1999).
92. Maccoby et al., supra note 81, at 141; Melli, supra note 43, at 219 & n.1; Gregory, supra
note 63, at 1042.
93. See e.g., Paul R. Amato & Joan G. Gilbreth, Nonresident Fathers and Children's Well-
Being: A Meta-Analysis, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 557, 557 (1999) (citing several studies that
find father contact has no significant effect on divorced children's well-being); Paul R. Amato,
Children's Adjustment to Divorce: Theories, Hypotheses, and Empirical Support, 55 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 23 (1993) (summarizing 32 studies of divorce in which 15 found that father
contact significantly and positively affected divorced children's well-being, seven found that
father contact significantly and negatively affected divorced children's well-being, and 10 found
that father contact had no significant association with divorced children's well-being); Maccoby
et al., supra note 81, at 142 (noting studies that indicate that the well-being of divorced children
who live with their mothers is unrelated to the amount of contact the children have with their
fathers); Valarie King & Holly E. Heard, Nonresident Father Visitation, Parental Conflict, and
Mother's Satisfaction: What's Best for Child Well-Being?, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 385, 387, 392
(1999); Judith A. Seltzer, Consequences of Marital Dissolution for Children, 20 ANN. REv. Soc.
235, 256 (1994) (noting that large nationally representative surveys indicate that frequent father
contact has no detectable benefits for divorced children); see also Czapanskiy, supra note 44, at
1438 n.83.
94. See, e.g., Paul R. Amato et al., Parental Divorce, Marital Conflict, and Offspring Well-
Being During Early Adulthood, 73 Soc. FORCES 895 (1995); Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra
note 20, at 185-87; Christy M. Buchanan et al., Adolescents and Their Families after Divorce:
Three Residential Arrangements Compared, 2 J. RES. ADOLESCENCE 261, 287-88 (1992); Andre
P. Derdeyn & Elizabeth Scott, Joint Custody: A Critical Analysis and Appraisal, 54 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 199, 204 (1984); Denise Donnelly & David Finkelhor, Does Equality in
Custody Arrangements Improve the Parent-Child Relationship?, 54 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 837,
843-44 (1992); E. Mavis Hetherington et al., Marital Transitions: A Child's Perspective, 44 AM.
PSYCHOL. 303, 307 (1989); Marsha Kline et al., The Long Shadow of Marital Conflict: A Model
of Children's Postdivorce Adjustment, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 297 (1991); Maccoby et al.,
supra note 81, at 152; Donna Ruane Morrison & Mary Jo Coiro, Parental Conflict and Marital
Disruption: Do Children Benefit When High-Conflict Marriages Are Dissolved, 61 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 626, 626-28, 635-36 (1999); Seltzer, supra note 93, at 253-54.
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the harassed parent, usually the mother.9 Such a provision also
invites the erroneous assumption that a child benefits from frequent
contact with an abusive father, 96 despite social science evidence that
spouse and child abuse severely harm children. 97 If the mother
attempts to restrict the abusive father's access to the children, perhaps
by seeking supervised visitation, this assumption creates a roadblock.
Worse, any attempt to restrict visitation invites the label of the
"unfriendly parent," which may jeopardize her custody of the child.
Within the hostile legal world they face, mothers must prepare
their custody cases carefully and thoroughly. Limited financial
resources can severely constrain a mother's ability to build a solid
custody case. She may not have the resources to hire a lawyer or
employ the expert witnesses necessary to present her case
effectively. 98 Even if she can employ a lawyer and experts, or a court
95. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 137 (noting that joint custody is
particularly painful for mothers who have been abused, because it forces them to interact more
frequently with their abusers).
96. Unsurprisingly many divorced children are forced to visit with those who have abused
them. See MASSACHUSETS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 69-70; Florida Gender
Bias Report, supra note 9, at 867; Missouri Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at 513, 567. Court
cases provide numerous examples. In a Massachusetts case, for instance, the court granted
visitation rights to a father who fired a gun into the home of his ex-girlfriend, killed her friend,
and was charged with attempted murder of his child. In another Massachusetts case, the court
asked a man who pled guilty to raping a woman whether he wanted visitation rights to the child
conceived as a result of the rape. See MASSACHUSETrS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 2, at
69. In a Florida case, a father, uncle, and grandfather sexually assaulted a five-year-old girl in
front of her eight-year-old brother. The past president of the Board of Women in Distress
stated:
[I]t took us 18 months-this happened in the last two years-18 months to be able to
stop the man from visitation rights[,] during which time he continued to abuse the
child.... But the judge said to me: "Do you as a counselor, do you as a professional,
believe that this child [has been abused]"- "Yes, absolutely." She said "[O]kay, thank
you," and went ahead and let him visit her alone.
Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 9, at 867. For many reasons, negotiated settlements
reflect this pattern. An abused mother, for instance, may agree to a custody or visitation
arrangement that fails to protect her and her child because she fears losing custody altogether.
See Bryan, supra note 3, at 1219-34 & nn.298-408. Moreover, guardians ad litem and custody
evaluators frequently disbelieve or minimize a mother's allegations of abuse. See id. at 1232-33
& nn.365-73. They consequently may recommend that the alleged perpetrator receive custody.
With no support from these professionals, the mother may agree to generous visitation in order
to avoid losing custody altogether.
97. See, e.g., Buel, supra note 91, at 734; Vangie A. Foshee et al., Family Violence and the
Perpetration of Adolescent Dating Violence: Examining Social Learning and Social Control
Processes, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 331, 338-40 (1999) (finding adolescent dating violence
associated with exposure to and experience of family violence); Meier, supra note 79, at 1307-09.
98. Partially due to their lack of competence regarding custody issues, courts have relied
more and more on recommendations by experts. The parties themselves may introduce
opposing expert testimony, the court may appoint a mental health professional to evaluate the
custody dispute, or the court may appoint a guardian ad litem or special advocate to assist in
determining the child's best interests. Unfortunately, these experts provide little competent
guidance to courts. For instance, if the parties introduce opposing expert testimony, the court
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appoints them at state expense, frequently these individuals prove as
biased against women as do judges.99 Understandably, a mother's
frequently experiences difficulty determining which expert to believe. If the court appoints a
mental health expert to evaluate the custody dispute, the expert frequently harbors biases
against women and/or lacks competence in a relevant area, such as domestic violence or child
sexual abuse. The same limitations attach to court appointed guardians ad litem and special
advocates. Experts, thus, do not necessarily protect a deserving mother's interests in the
custody of her children. Nevertheless, without a supporting expert, a mother easily may lose
custody of the children.
99. See Bryan, supra note 3, at 1198-200 & nn.210-18. Mertz and Lonsway begin their
thoughtful article on denial of child sexual abuse with the following representative story:
A court-approved psychologist in a California custody case asked Jeannette, 14,
whether she wanted to live with her father or her mother. When Jeanette picked her
father, her mother.., expressed alarm, telling the court that her former husband's
drinking and physical abuse caused the family's breakup. Despite [the mother's]
warning, the psychologist declared that Jeannette would be safe with her father. A
week later, Jeannette's arm was twisted so severely that the girl's school reported her
father to the state's child protective service agency.... The father told an investigator
they were just "playing rough".... No charges were filed. In this case, the court
psychologist was also the father's private therapist... Jeannette and her mother say
that in their case, the psychologist's decision almost had tragic consequences. While
the custody arrangement set up by [the psychologist] was still in effect, Jeannette tried
to kill herself.... Only after the girl was hospitalized for an attempted overdose of
prescription medicine was she returned to her mother's care.
Mertz & Lonsway, supra note 77, at 1416. They present another representative case:
In one [case involving a battered wife], a psychiatrist with 18 years experience in his
field became very disturbed at the victim's unfeeling response to her tearful husband.
On the basis of that and the fact that she had been sexually molested as a child ... he
determined that she was incapable of an emotionally healthy relationship with a man
and recommended that the two-year-old twin daughters be given to the father. The
psychiatrist... became so emotionally involved in the case that he defended the
husband's abuse as a justified response to an hysterical wife and refused to investigate
her allegations by calling her friends and neighbors who had witnessed the abuse. His
reason for refusing to do so was "based on the malignancy of her imagination, I can't
depend on what she has put in her lady friends' minds."
Id. at 1437-38 (quoting Laura Crites & Donna Coker, What Therapists See that Judges May Miss,
27 JUDGES' J. 9, 40-41 (1988)). Mertz and Lonsway also note that psychologists who use
"systems" approaches may presume that all parties in an abusive family system bear some
responsibility for the violence. See id. at 1438; see also Meier, supra note 79, at 1301-02. The
mental health profession's recent focus and insistence upon the value of fathers to children's
well-being, reflected in its bias in favor of joint custody, also seems puzzling when no credible
evidence indicates that joint custody serves the best interests of most, or even many, children.
See Maccoby et al., supra note 81, at 152-54. Some suspect that this bias provides one more
example of the psychological profession serving as an instrument of social control over women,
helping to preserve preexisting hierarchy. See Scarlet Pollock & Jo Sutton, Father's Rights,
Women's Losses, 8 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 593 (1985). This suspicion receives historical
support. Until recent years, the male dominated psychological profession marginalized
women's concerns, portrayed women as inferior hysterical human beings, and urged women to
happily assume their proper subordinate position to men. Sanity in women often meant little
more than proper accommodation to male dominance. See generally PHYLLIS CHESLER,
WOMEN AND MADNESS (1972); SYLVIA A. HEWLETr, A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF
WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN AMERICA (1986); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 152-53, 283 n.42 (1989); Jeri Dawn Wine, Models of Human
Functioning: A Feminist Perspective, 8 INT'L. J. WOMEN'S STUD. 183, 189 (1985). Moreover,
mental health professionals long have blamed mothers for children's developmental problems.
See Becker, Double Binds, supra note 20, at 13; Fineman, supra note 20, at 767 n.161; Martha
Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43
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fear of losing custody may lead her to agree to a poor
custody/visitation arrangement and/or to accept a poor financial
settlement, cementing her disadvantaged position after divorce.?°
Increasingly, courts encourage or order divorcing spouses to
mediate their divorce disputes.10 Mediators, however, prove to be as
gender biased as attorneys and judges.1° In mediation, the wife must
negotiate directly with her husband. Only indeterminate laws support
her claims, and even those laws lack relevance in mediation.0 3
Moreover, many lawyers do not attend mediation with their clients,104
thus failing to insulate women from their husbands' powerful
manipulations. Unsurprisingly, the wife typically fares poorly in
mediation, 1°' especially if she has experienced abuse by her
husband.106
VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1682 (1990); Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L.
REv. 95, 110-11 & n.81 (1993); see also Catherine McBride-Chang et al., Mother-Blaming,
Psychology and the Law, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 69 (1992).
100. See Fineman, supra note 20, at 761. Even worse, mothers may choose to endure
physical and emotional abuse rather than risk losing custody of their children at divorce. See
Danaya C. Wright, DeManneville v. DeManneville: Rethinking the Birth of Custody Law Under
Patriarchy, 17 L. & HIST. REv. 247, 250 (1999) (noting that during the nineteenth century in
England, when patriarchal laws firmly protected men's interests in their children, "[m]any
women tolerated physical abuse, infidelity, and impoverishment from husbands who threatened
to cut off access to children if they complained"). Brinig and Buckley make a counter-historical
argument. Their research indicates that jurisdictions with joint custody laws have lower divorce
rates. See Margaret F. Brinig & F. H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring
Theories, 73 IND. L.J. 393, 403, 417 (1998). They assert that their research also supports their
explanatory hypothesis: joint custody laws encourage fathers to bond more with their children
because fathers need not anticipate a complete loss of custody at divorce, and these enhanced
emotional ties make divorce less likely. See id. at 393, 423. They do mention as an alternative
explanation, however, that women might remain in an abusive marriage rather than risk joint
custody, see id. at 423, and suggest that further research should address this question. See id.
For thoughtful critiques on Brinig and Buckley's research and conclusions, see Ann Laquer
Estin, Bonding After Divorce: Comments on Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring Theories,
73 IND. L.J. 441 (1998), and Saul Levmore, Joint Custody and Strategic Behavior, 73 IND. L.J.
429 (1998).
101. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 145, 170.
102. See, e.g., id at 145, 168, 172-73, 175; Bryan, supra note 11, at 189 n.9; Penelope E.
Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 441,
508-509 & n.276 (1992); Fineman, supra note 20, at 761; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1555, 1584-90, 1594-96 (1991).
103. See Bryan, supra note 102, at 506 & n.271.
104. See Bryan, supra note 11, at 183-88; Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers:
Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L.
REv. 1317, 1351 (1995). However, the lawyer's presence does not necessarily protect the wife
from her husband's or from the mediator's manipulations. See Bryan, supra note 11, at 186.
105. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 175-77; MASSACHUSETTS
GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 23-27; Carol S. Bruch, And How Are the Children? The
Effects of Ideology and Mediation on Child Custody Law and Children's Well-Being in the
United States, 8 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 106, 119 (1988); Bryan, supra note 11, at 177-88; Bryan, supra
note 102; Grillo, supra note 102, at 1561-63 & n.73.
106. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 242-45. For a comprehensive
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II. FEMINIST WORK ON DIVORCE
Feminists have attempted to remedy many of the problems
women face in divorce.1°7 Some recognize that the ideology of formal
equality advocated by liberal feminists disadvantages divorcing
women in financial and custody disputes. They advocate a different
type of feminism that emphasizes the value that caretaking women
provides, and accepts women's financial dependency that typically
derives from that caretaking and marginal workforce participation. 1°8
They advocate substantive, 1°9 rather than formal, equality for women.
Other feminist theorists have worked to dissolve the perceptual
barrier between the family and the market, °10 a barrier that devalues
the labor that women perform in the home and denies the economic
partnership aspect of marriage."' Still others note that feminist
theorists, generally, have ignored the strength and importance to
women of the mother-child bond."' They encourage the acceptance
assessment of the disadvantages wives face in divorce mediation, see Bryan, supra note 102.
107. Many believe that feminists also played a critical role in the no-fault divorce movement
during the 1960s and 1970s. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 477-78. The history of the no-fault
movement, however, does not support this belief. See id. Rather, feminists did not actively
participate in the campaign that focused primarily on corruption and fraud in the courts and the
excessive alimony that allegedly burdened men. See id. at 78-79 (citing DEBORAH L. RHODE,
JuSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 147 (1989).
108. See Martha A. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social
Change, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789; Williams, supra note 6. Williams also notes a recent study by
Jane Waldfogel that finds that women's family status accounts for 45% of the gender gap in
wages at age 30 and that women's lower levels of work experience explains another 19% of the
gap. See Williams, supra note 6, at 99 & nn.40-41 (citing Jane Waldfogel, The Family Gap for
Young Women in the United States and Britain, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 505, 519 (1998)). Williams
concludes that women's family responsibilities explain a full two-thirds of the wage gap between
men and women. See id.; see also Smith, supra note 2, at 146-47.
109. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 108, at 791. Bartlett & Harris compare substantive and
formal equality as follows:
While formal sex equality judges the form of a rule, requiring that it treat women and
men on the same terms without special barriers or favors on account of their sex,
substantive equality looks to the rule's results because of significant differences in the
characteristics and circumstances of women and men. Advocates of substantive
equality demand that rules take account of these differences to avoid gender-related
outcomes that are considered unfair.
GENDER AND THE LAW, supra note 35, at 261. Joan Williams goes farther and advocates a
"reconstructive feminism" that seeks to eliminate the ideal-worker norm in market work and in
family entitlements, because that ideal-worker norm discriminates against women, especially
mothers. Williams, supra note 6, at 95-97.
110. See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). Williams, for instance, argues that the invisible work of
women in the home supports the ideal worker status of husbands in the market. See Williams,
supra note 6, at 118-19; Williams, supra note 19; see also BURGGRAF, supra note 30; Slaughter,
supra note 6.
111. See generally BURGORAF, supra note 30.
112. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 136-37. The reluctance of feminists to
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of and the development of feminist theory acknowledging that bond.
Many feminists expose that our society in general fails to
adequately value a woman's work in the home13 and her contribution
to her husband's workforce participation. 114  Nor do legal decision-
makers recognize how a mother's caretaking responsibilities
compromise her workforce participation before and after divorce." 5
They illustrate how these oversights weaken a wife's claim for spousal
maintenance. Seeking to provide justification for a wife's claim to her
husband's postdivorce income stream,1 6 they emphasize how wives
contribute to their husbands' workforce success and how the
necessary labors wives perform at home compromise their own
income capacity." 7 They then propose specific formulas to allocate
equitably the postdivorce income of spouses." 8
Feminist groups have fought for, and in some instances, have
obtained, more equitable property distribution laws."9  Twenty to
thirty years ago, if the husband titled property in his name, the law
awarded him that property upon divorce.1 20  Today, with the
exception of property acquired by gift, bequest, or inheritance, all
property acquired during the marriage, irrespective of title, becomes
part of the marital estate.'2' Moreover, courts now recognize certain
focus on family issues as opposed to individual equality with men has deep historical roots.
During the nineteenth century, the first wave of feminism in America advocated for individual
property and civil rights for middle-class women. In contrast, social feminists led the second
wave of feminism at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century and
shifted the feminist agenda to a concern for poor children and their families. Historians and
modem-day feminists have criticized social feminists for compromising women's struggle for
equality with men by reinforcing nineteenth-century stereotypes about proper roles for men and
women: women's sphere remained the home, while men's sphere remained the world. See
MASON, supra note 49, at 88-89.
113. See MICHIGAN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 14, at 55; Williams, supra note 6, at
119.
114. See Williams, supra note 6, at 110.
115. See MICHIGAN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 14, at 50.
116. See Slaughter, supra note 6, at 95 (describing spousal maintenance as delayed wages for
mothering).
117. See MICHIGAN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 14, at 50.
11& See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 479-80; Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A
Proposal for Valuing Women's Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEx. L. REv.
17 (1998); Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the
Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423 (1994); Starnes, supra note 33; Amy L.
Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84
VA. L. REV. 509, 656-64 (1998); Williams, supra note 19.
119. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 479-80.
120. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in
a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2533 (1994).
121. See Doris Jones Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An
Overview, 23 FAM. L.Q. 495, 522-24 (1990); Bartlett, supra note 1, at 479. Some jurisdictions
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assets as property that they failed to recognize in the past.122
Regarding custody issues, feminists have exposed the limitations
and potential dangers for women and children of the best interests
standard, 123 presumptions in favor of joint custody, 124 friendly parent
provisions, 125 and assumptions that divorced children fare best with
frequent and continuing contact with both parents.126 They have
explained the extreme disadvantage of abused women at divorce 127
and have lobbied successfully for custody laws that address domestic
violence. 1 Many feminists propose custody standards that honor the
caretaking parent and simultaneously encourage the involvement of
both parents in the lives of their children. 129 In an attempt to curb
even allow distribution of nonmarital property, see, e.g., Robert J. Levy, An Introduction to
Divorce-Property Issues, 23 FAM. L.Q. 147, 156 (1989), or the increase in the value of non-
marital assets. See Bryan, supra note 102, at 443 n.2 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(4)
(1974)).
122. Bryan, supra note 102, at 443 n.2.
123. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 138; Bryan, supra note 3, at 1192-201;
Jacobs, supra note 67; Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80
CAL. L. REV. 615, 616-17 (1992).
124. See, e.g., Dawn M. Bourque, "Reconstructing" the Patriarchal Nuclear Family: Recent
Developments in Child Custody and Access in Canada, 10 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC. 1, 3 & n.5
(1995); Buel, supra note 91, at 732-36; Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 184-88;
Bryan, supra note 3, at 1192-93; Czapanskiy, supra note 44, at 1438 (noting how joint legal
custody restricts the autonomy of the primary custodian, usually the mother); Schulman & Pitt,
supra note 81; Scott, supra note 123, at 616-17; Stark, supra note 20, at 356 & n.313.
125. See Bryan, supra note 3, at 1192-94; Schulman & Pitt, supra note 81, at 554-56.
126. See Bryan, supra note 3, at 1192-94.
127. See id. at 1219-34 & nn.300-77.
128. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 497 (noting that at least two-thirds of states require courts
to consider domestic violence in custody cases); Keenan, supra note 67; Meier, supra note 79, at
1303, 1309. Many state statutes now contain provisions that (1) exempt battered wives from
mandatory mediation of custody disputes, see Bartlett, supra note 1, at 497 & n.106; (2) create a
presumption against joint legal or physical custody when domestic violence exists, see id. at 497
& n.104; (3) recognize that abusive parents presumptively should not have custody of the
children, see id.; (4) instruct courts not to hold the battered spouse's departure from the marital
home against him/her in a custody proceeding; (5) specifically acknowledge that domestic
violence between spouses harms children; and (6) allow battered spouses to obtain ex parte
temporary restraining orders. See id. at 495-96; see also id. at 494-99 (discussing a broad range
of feminist contributions to domestic violence issues).
129. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN: THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, THE
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991) (advocating abandonment of abstract
equality standards in custody cases in favor of standards that honor nurturing of children);
Bartlett, supra note 1, at 483 n.34; Phyllis T. Bookspan, From a Tender Years Presumption to a
Primary Parent Presumption: Has Anything Really Changed?... Should It?, 8 BYU J. PUB. L.
75 (1994); Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 957 (1999); Czapanskiy, supra note 44, at 1462; Becker, Double Binds, supra note 20, at
28-29; Fineman, supra note 20, at 768-74; Polikoff, supra note 54, at 237, 241-43; Laura Sack,
Women and Children First: A Feminist Analysis of the Primary Caretaker Standard in Child
Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 291 (1992); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott,
Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1278-79 (1998); Scott, supra note 123; see
also Becker. Maternal Feelings. supra note 20. at 192-224 (discussing the limitations of the
primary caretaker standard and advocating a maternal deference standard).
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bias and promote more equitable outcomes, feminists urge judicial
and lawyer education regarding all divorce issues.130
Other feminists have critiqued the procedures used to resolve
divorce disputes, seeking to level the playing field between husbands
and wives and encourage more equitable outcomes. Many, for
instance, insist, and explain why, judges should not require spouses,
especially abused spouses, ' 3  to participate in divorce mediation. 132
Some expose the disadvantages facing wives in all settlement
negotiations.133
Despite considerable feminist effort, however, wives continue to
fair poorly at divorce. Divorce law grows increasingly hostile to
women's financial and custody interests 34 Women's meager financial
resources continue to compromise their cases. Uneducated judges
and lawyers persistently discriminate against women. And, the legal
procedures used to resolve divorce disputes remain substantially the
130. See CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 160, 164-66, 201-02; OHIO
GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 76, 78, 81-82; Jacobs, supra note 67, at 898-900; Klein &
Orloff, supra note 17, at 810, 812-13 & n.16-17.
131. See, e.g., Buel, supra note 91, at 731-32; Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering
and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REv. 2117 (1993); Andree G.
Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation for Battered Women, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
272 (1992); Robert Geffner & Mildred D. Pagelow, Mediation and Child Custody Issues in
Abusive Relationships, 8 BEHAV. So. & L. 151 (1990); Charlotte Germane et al., Mandatory
Custody Mediation and Joint Custody Orders in California: The Danger for Victims of Domestic
Violence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 175 (1985); Barbara J. Hart, Gentle Jeopardy: The Further
Endangerment of Battered Women and Children in Custody Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317
(1990); see also Lisa Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal
Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984).
132. See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 105; Bryan, supra note 102; Bryan, supra note 11; Girdner,
supra note 86; Fineman, supra note 20; Grillo, supra note 102; Meyers, supra note 89; Singer,
supra note 20, at 1540-43; Laurie Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women's Progress on Family
Law Issues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431 (1985); see also Polikoff, Gender and Child Custody
Determinations: Exploding the Myths, in FAMILIES, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICIES: A
FEMINIST DIALOGUE ON WOMEN AND THE STATE 183 (Irene Diamond ed., 1983); Mary P.
Treuthart, In Harm's Way? Family Mediation and the Role of the Attorney Advocate, 23
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 717 (1993).
133. See generally Bryan, supra note 3; see also Kathryn Abrams, Choice, Dependence, and
the Reinvigoration of the Traditional Family, 73 IND. L.J. 517, 519-27 (1998) (questioning
women's "freedom" of choice in negotiating marital contracts).
134. For instance, the primary caretaker presumption custody standard, favored by many
feminists, originated in West Virginia with Justice Neely's decision in Garska v. McCoy, 278
S.E.2d 357 (1981). During its last session, the West Virginia legislature revised the West
Virginia custody statute, rejecting the primary caretaker presumption and creating a
presumption in favor of joint decisionmaking. See W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2-1, 48-11-201 (1999).
Minnesota, the only other state to adopt the primary caretaker presumption, also abandoned
that standard in 1990. See Robert J. Levy, Trends in Legislative Regulation of Family Law
Doctrine, 33 FAM. L.Q. 543, 546 (1999). Some states, however, do include the primary caretaker
as a factor to consider in determining the best interests of the child. See OHIO GENDER BIAS
REPORT, supra note 8, at 80; Bartlett, supra note 1, at 483 & n.36.
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same,13 perpetuating women's vulnerability at divorce. In Catharine
MacKinnon's words, "This is what inequality looks like. '136
III. THE BARRIERS
A. Division Within Feminist Ranks
Certainly all feminists do not think alike. In analyzing the data
collected in the 1992 National Election Studies, for instance,
researchers found that of the 1171 women responding, 319 or 27.2%
labeled themselves as feminist.137 These 319 women showed great
diversity in beliefs and attitudes. For instance, 32.7% of the self-
identified feminists agreed that "We have gone too far in pushing
equal rights in this country," and 37.9% agreed that "This country
would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are."138
Feminists have struggled to promote the understanding that for
women the "personal is political"'139 and to teach women the necessity
of collective action.' 4° Yet when the responding women were asked
the relative effectiveness of individual versus collective action, 23.5%
of the self-identified feminists believed that individual effort alone
was sufficient to improve women's position in society. 41 Forty-four
percent of the self-identified feminists strongly agreed that "This
country would have many fewer problems if there were more
emphasis on traditional family ties," and 29.7% strongly agreed that
"The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our
society.' 1 42 One of ten feminists agreed that "by law, abortion should
never be permitted.11 43 One of three feminists opposed a state law
135. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 688-93 (explaining that mediation and
negotiation remain the process of choice in family law); Leonard L. Loeb, New Forms of
Resolving Disputes-ADR, 33 FAM. L.Q. 581, 582-85 (1999) (noting the growing popularity of
divorce mediation); Jessica Pearson, Court Services: Meeting the Needs of Twenty-First Century
Families, 33 FAM. L.Q. 617, 621-22 (1999) (noting the growing popularity of divorce mediation).
136. MacKinnon, supra note 59, at 1313.
137. See Nancy Felipe Russo, Measuring Feminist Attitudes: Just What Does It Mean to Be a
Feminist?, 22 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 313, 313 (1998).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 314. Collins explains that the personal becomes political because of the role
political, social, and cultural contexts play in influencing individual behavior. See Lynn H.
Collins, Illustrating Feminist Theory: Power and Psychopathology, 22 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 97,
98 (1998); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 864
& n.143 (1990).
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that would allocate government funds to assist poor women in
obtaining abortions,144 63.1% favored a state law requiring parental
consent for a teenager under age eighteen to obtain an abortion, 145
and 51.4% of the feminists favored a law that required a married
woman to notify her husband before obtaining an abortion.146
Liberal feminists continue to focus on women's equality to
men,'147  while cultural feminists point to and value women's
differences from men.14 Despite strong criticism within feminist
ranks,'149 liberal feminists remain hesitant to acknowledge how women
differ from men, fearing that such acknowledgement will lead to more
laws that discriminate against women based on those same
differences. 150 Radical feminists perceive women's perceptions,'
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. Greater consensus existed among feminists on some issues. For example, 75.1%
reported very frequent anger at the treatment women receive, and 90.4% found sexual
harassment a "very serious" or "somewhat serious" problem in the workplace. See id.
Approximately nine of 10 feminists agreed that men and women should have equal influence in
government, business, and industry, and the family. See id. This leaves, however,
approximately 10% of self-proclaimed feminists believing that men should have greater power
in these realms. See id. at 314-15.
147. See Christine A. Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense to Talk About "Women"?, 1 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 21 n.28 (1991).
148. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); see also Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1, 14-21 (1988). The debate between feminists on the importance and value of women's
domestic roles as wife and mother began during the woman's suffrage movement. Some women
active in the movement opposed more radical suffragettes who sought to make divorce more
readily available. They argued that easier divorce would result in men casting off women
beyond their primes, making remarriage beyond their reach. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 477-
78.
149. See ARENDELL, supra note 2, at 152-54; FINEMAN, supra note 129, at 176; FINEMAN,
supra note 60, at 12; MARY ANN MASON, THE EQUALITY TRAP 22 (1988); Mary E. Becker,
Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 201, 204; Littleton, supra note 39, at
1279 n.2. See generally MacKinnon, supra note 59 (discussing the ineffectiveness of formal sex
equality in eliminating many disadvantages women face in the law and in society).
150. Williams, for instance, notes that many feminists remain reluctant to acknowledge that
women's family responsibilities compromise women's workforce participation. They fear that
employers will use this information to justify not hiring women. See Williams, supra note 6, at
100. See generally Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989)
(discussing how stereotyping women as relationship-centered can produce and perpetuate
women's economic marginalization); West, supra note 148, at 21 (noting Wendy Williams'
argument that most of the disadvantages imposed on women derive from women's capacity to
become pregnant and from the real and imagined implications of pregnancy). Catharine
MacKinnon, often labeled a radical, or dominance feminist, also argues that "[f]or women to
affirm difference, when difference means dominance, as it does with gender, means to affirm the
qualities and characteristics of powerlessness." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 39 (1987).
151. Andrea Dworkin, for instance, explains that women delude themselves about
heterosexual intercourse:
In the experience of intercourse, she loses the capacity for integrity because her
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choices, 152 and position in society as by-products of the repressive
patriarchal context in which women survive. 53 Acceptance feminists
argue that, whatever the reason for women's roles and choices,
political and legal strategies and policies should accept and respond to
women's reality. 5 4 Critical race feminists point to the failure of elite
body-the basis of privacy and freedom in the material world for all human beings-is
entered and occupied: the boundaries of her physical body are-neutrally speaking-
violated. What is taken from her in that act is not recoverable, and she spends her
life-wanting, after all to have something-pretending that pleasure is in being
reduced through intercourse to insignificance.... She learns to eroticize powerlessness
and self-annihilation. The very boundaries of her own body become meaningless to
her, and even worse, useless to her. The transgression of those boundaries comes to
signify a sexually charged degradation into which she throws herself, having been told,
convinced, that identity, for a female, is there-somewhere beyond privacy and self-
respect.
ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 137-38 (1987).
152. For radical feminists, even "wanted" heterosexual intercourse is intrusive:
[I]t preempts, challenges, negates, and renders impossible the maintenance of physical
integrity and the formation of a unified self. The deepest unofficial story of radical
feminism may be that intimacy-the official value of cultural feminism-is itself
oppressive. Women secretly, unofficially, and surreptitiously long for the very
individuation that cultural feminism insists women fear: the freedom, the
independence, the individuality, the sense of wholeness, the confidence, the self-
esteem, and the security of identity which can only come from a life, a history, a path, a
voice, a sexuality, a womb, and a body of one's own.
West, supra note 148, at 35. Worse, women's high regard for physical heterosexual intimacy
constitutes collaboration with patriarchy. See DWORKIN, supra note 151, at 141-42. But see
West, supra note 148, at 46-47, for a critique of Dworkin's view equating women's regard for
heterosexual intimacy as collaboration with patriarchy.
153. See MACKINNON, supra note 99, at 37-80, 99-100, 205. West finds a connection
between cultural and radical feminism in that both theories conceptualize women's existential
state as grounded in women's potential for physical connection to human life, in other words, in
women's fundamental difference from men. See West, supra note 148, at 14. She explains the
division between cultural and radical feminists:
[W]hile radical and cultural feminists agree that women's lives are distinctive in their
potential for material connection to others, they provide sharply contrasting accounts
of the subjective experience of the material and existential state of connection.
According to cultural feminist accounts of women's subjectivity, women value
intimacy, develop a capacity for nurturance, and an ethic of care for the "other" with
which we are connected, just as we learn to dread and fear separation from the
other.... According to radical feminism, women's connection with the "other" is
above all else invasive and intrusive: women's potential for material "connection"
invites invasion into the physical integrity of our bodies, and intrusion into the
existential integrity of our lives. Although women may "officially" value the intimacy
of connection, we "unofficially" dread the intrusion it inevitably entails, and long for
the individuation and independence that deliverance from that state of connection
would permit.
Id. at 15. West concludes that both strands of feminism offer a truth of women's experience.
She notes the experiential rather than logical contradiction between them, arguing that women
may value intimacy and simultaneously dread the intrusion and invasion intimacy implies.
Women also may fear separation while they simultaneously long for the individualization that
separation can bring. See id. at 53.
154. Fineman explains:
[A]cceptance arguments ... encompass both biological and cultural sexual differences
and seek to ensure "symmetry" in the ultimate positions of women and men by taking
account of those differences. In this way, acceptance arguments are similar to the
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white feminists to address the different needs and interests of
minority women. 15  All feminists fret about essentialism,'15 6 wondering
whether any collective feminist voice can capture the differences
among women. While the theoretical angst and diversity in feminist
thought 157 can spark intellectual growth, it also can undermine
feminist political power. 58
The different theoretical leanings of feminists lead to conflicting
proposals on divorce issues.159 Some feminists dislike custody laws
that openly favor mothers over fathers.16 While today most feminists
perceive joint custody as detrimental to women's interests, 6' some
feminists favor joint custody.16 2 They reason that joint custody might
earlier attempts to fashion different types of equality to gain equality of results.
FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 42 (citations omitted); see also Littleton, supra note 39 (setting forth
a theory of equality based on acceptance).
155. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, in
MOTHERS IN LAW, supra note 67, at 224.
156. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 48; ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL
WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); JOAN WILLIAMS,
UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICr AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 172-
75 (2000); Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 165-66; Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 1241, 1245-51 (1991); Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102 YALE L.J.
1265, 1265-66 (1993) (reviewing FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER
(Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991)); Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585, 588 (1990); Littleton, supra note 144;
MacKinnon, supra note 59, at 1291-97; Note, Patriarchy Is Such a Drag: The Strategic
Possibilities of a Postmodern Account of Gender, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1973, 1974 (1995).
157. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 476-77, 484-87 (acknowledging tensions in feminist
thought and practice regarding family and divorce issues).
15& See Russo, supra note 137, at 314. In supporting California's statute that guaranteed
job-protected leave during any disability due to pregnancy, Littleton tells of having to argue
against the very feminists she had chosen as role models. See Littleton, supra note 147, at 26.
She also notes, however, that those feminists helped sensitize her to feminist arguments against
the statute. See id.; see also Bryan, supra note 3, at 1170 & n.72.
159. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 483. West locates women's support of potentially
conflicting legal reforms in the contradictions embedded in women's subjective lives. "It
explains why women insist upon and embrace an ethic of care and the right to have children
without economic hardship, while at the same time fighting for rights of individuation, physical
privacy, and freedom." West, supra note 148, at 54-55.
160. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 483.
161. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 184-88; Czapanskiy, supra note 44, at
1468; Fineman, supra note 67, at 221 ("[J]oint custody and the ideal of shared parenting have
ensured continued male control over children and, through them, over their mothers even as
divorce has become available virtually on demand.").
162 See Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the
Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 10 (1986); see also Becker, Maternal
Feelings, supra note 20, at 165 (noting that some feminists favor joint custody). But see Bartlett,
supra note 1, at 483 n.34 (noting that she no longer favors joint custody, but rather a standard
based upon the percentage of caretaking each parent performs during the marriage). See
generally Rena K. Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107, 109 (1978) ("Feminists of both sexes correctly perceive that unless
the daily concerns of child rearing become the shared responsibility of both father and mother,
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encourage divorced fathers to share more in the burdens and joys of
caretaking and allow mothers more work 163 and/or leisure time.'("
Most feminists currently favor some version of the primary caretaker
standard,165 while others argue that only a maternal deference custody
standard can truly protect a mother's interest in her children and
minimize the likelihood that a mother will trade economic security for
custody.166 Some feminists favor spousal maintenance or a property
there is little chance that women with children will achieve equality outside the home.").
163. Liberal feminists seem to believe that women's equal participation in the workforce
will lead eventually to women's equality with men. Interestingly, social science research
suggests that women's participation in the workforce does not alter the power relations in
marriages. See Veronica Jaris Tichenor, Status and Income as Gendered Resources: The Case of
Marital Power, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 638, 638-39 (1999). Rather, even when the wife earns
more than the husband, he retains the lion's share of marital power. See id. at 638; see also
Sanjiv Gupta, The Effects of Transitions in Marital Status on Men's Performance of Housework,
61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 700, 701 (1999). Division of unpaid household labor between men and
women explains some of the difference in marital power. Twiggs et al. explain:
The gender perspective offers one explanation for the continuing lopsided division of
household labor. From this perspective, performing housework certainly produces
material results such as clean clothes and hot meals, but the gendered division of
household labor also produces proper gender relations and social identities.
Researchers in this perspective argue that all work, including work done at home
without pay, is "dual aspect activity" and takes on symbolic meaning, part of which is
gendered meaning. From this perspective, both labor-market work and household
work are divided less from considerations of skill, time, or talent, than from efforts to
establish boundaries between men's and women's work. Such boundaries affirm and
reproduce masculinity and femininity, and doing the sort of work defined as
inappropriate for one's gender produces demands for accountability or justifications
for why such a transgression of normative expectations is warranted.
Joan E. Twiggs et al., Meaning and Measurement Reconceptualizing Measures of the Division of
Household Labor, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 712, 713 (1999) (citations omitted).
164. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 165, 184 (noting these arguments in
favor of joint custody); Czapanskiy, supra note 44, at 1468. Bartlett also notes:
Still, there are substantive differences between feminists that explain why one equality
solution to a particular problem seems superior to another. Joan Williams puts her
finger on one substantive difference when she distinguishes between equal parenting
advocates and maternalists. Advocates of equal roles in the home and at work put a
high priority on men sharing the burdens (and joys) of childrearing and family and
women obtaining the opportunities of paid employment, viewing this shared role ideal
as necessitating the elimination of not only barriers to women, but favored treatment
as well. Maternalists believe the goal should not be to change women by directing
them away from motherhood and women's work, but rather to support them when
they take these traditional paths.
Bartlett, supra note 1, at 486 (footnotes omitted). Lorber et al., however, question the
feasibility of joint parenting: "If most men have developed nonaffective personalities and strong
ego boundaries, where are you going to find enough men with psychological capabilities to
parent well and thus break the general pattern of the emotional primacy of the mothers?"
Judith Lorber et al., On the Reproduction of Mothering: A Methodological Debate, 6 SIGNs 482,
485 (1981).
165. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 1, at 483 n.34; Becker, Double Binds, supra note 20, at 28-
29; Fineman, supra note 20, at 768-74; Polikoff, supra note 54, at 237, 241-43; Sack, supra note
129; Scott, supra note 123.
166. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 205-24. Becker recognizes that her
proposed standard might result in occasional unfairness to the atypical father. See id. at 217.
She also acknowledges that the standard, when applied by biased judges, may produce no better
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distribution scheme that presumptively awards the wife a portion of
her husband's post-divorce income.167  Others express concern that
such laws might encourage wives to perpetuate the cult of domesticity
that keeps them financially dependent upon their husbands. 168 Many
feminists criticize divorce mediation as a process of choice, yet others
continue to believe in mediation's potential.169
While I respect the intellectual fertility that the different strands
of feminism represent, I urge all feminists to work to set aside their
theoretical and policy differences and develop a cohesive political
agenda regarding women's issues in divorce. Although we may want
to deny it,170 we are engaged in an intense struggle with men, a
outcomes for mothers. See id. at 218. The standard also could reinforce traditional stereotypes
about proper maternal behavior and about the essential nature of women as mothers, retarding
social change. See id. at 218. She concludes, however, that some potential costs likely are
exaggerated, see id. at 220-21, and that the standard's ability to protect most women from the
economic and emotional consequences of fathers' threats to pursue custody overweighs its
potential costs. See id. at 219-20; see also Mary Ann Mason, Motherhood v. Equal Treatment, 29
J. FAM. L. 1, 23-28 (1990) (discussing the advantages of a maternal presumption). Wax also
argues for a maternal preference standard in order to strengthen the wife's bargaining position
during marriage and to remove the husband's bargaining chip at divorce. See Wax, supra note
118, at 641-42.
167. See, e.g., Jana Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1102, 1117
(1989) (advocating a continuation of the couple's joint financial status for a set period after
divorce); Williams, supra note 19, at 2260-61 (advocating income equalization between divorced
spouses during the dependency of the children and for a set time thereafter).
168. See Slaughter, supra note 6, at 95-96; Williams, supra note 19, at 2285 & n.299.
Slaughter notes that liberal feminists disfavor spousal maintenance because its unavailability
will encourage women to develop and maintain ties to the labor market. See Slaughter, supra
note 6, at 95-96. Slaughter argues, however, that
[tihis argument [of liberal feminists], however, only works against two background
assumptions. One is that men will take up the slack in childrearing, a dubious
assumption given the unequal distribution of market power between men and women.
The other is that women will participate in the market because opportunity is
unlimited. Structural asymmetries in the market, however, put a brake on whatever
shifts women may make from family to market. The combination is lethal: marital ties
are destabilized by no-fault, leaving Mothers without the protection of lifelong
marriage, but earning power is still constrained, leaving them without the means to
support themselves and their children fully and adequately. The legal regime
constructs women as Mothers but requires them to function as potential Breadwinners,
which they cannot do because they are Mothers.
Id. at 96; see also Bartlett, supra note 1, at 482 (noting that, for symbolic reasons, feminists
generally disfavored alimony).
169. See Stark, supra note 20, at 354-55.
170. As Adrienne Rich notes:
[K]aren Horney... says that "it is in the interest of men to obscure [the fact that there
is a struggle between the sexes]; and the emphasis they place on their ideologies has
caused women, also, to adopt these theories." In her delicately worded essay, "The
Distrust Between the Sexes," Horney speaks of the resentment and anxiety harbored
by all men toward women-even, she says, by "men who consciously have a very
positive relationship with women and hold them in high esteem as human beings."
ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMEN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 111
(2d ed. 1987) (quoting KAREN HORNEY, FEMININE PSYCHOLOGY 106-18 (1967)).
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struggle with strong implications for our future. I argue here that no
issues prove more central to the future of the feminist movement than
those presented in divorce.
Please take just a moment to imagine what women and their
children currently learn from their divorce experiences. Think of
Helen, a thirty-five-year-old mother of two children, one a boy, the
other a girl. Helen finally marshals the courage to leave an abusive
marriage of twelve years duration.171 Although she earned a college
degree in English and a certificate to teach in high school before the
marriage, throughout the marriage her husband had forbidden her to
work and tightly has controlled her access to all financial resources.
She has managed, however, to hide some money, and her family and
friends offer to help her financially.
Helen hires a lawyer. The lawyer files a Motion for Temporary
Support, Attorney Fees Pendente Lite, asking also for exclusive use
and possession of the marital home. The court denies the motion,172
leaving Helen without access to her husband's income and forcing her
and the children to seek temporary and unfamiliar shelter. The
children lose contact with friends, school, and community. Helen
becomes acutely distressed about her financial situation and feels
guilty about her inability to provide adequately for her children. Her
lawyer accurately tells her that the law does not guarantee her
spousal maintenance or an equal share of the marital assets. He will
do what he can, but the judge ultimately can do whatever he thinks is
fair. In addition to her mounting financial concerns, Helen
continually fears for her safety and for that of her children. The
quality of her parenting declines as her stress increases.
Her lawyer informs Helen that her husband intends to contest
custody. She grows increasingly fearful. She unconsciously transmits
that fear to her children. 173 Her lawyer begins to prepare her custody
171. Many divorcing women have experienced violence in their marriages. See supra note
86.
172 See CONNECrICUT GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 19, at 138 (acknowledging that
judges do not award attorney fees pendente lite); CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra
note 6, at 194 (noting that judges typically refuse to award attorney fees at the time of
temporary orders).
173. See Reed W. Larson & Sally Gillman, Transmission of Emotions in the Daily
Interactions of Single-Mother Families, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 21 (1999) (finding that the
anxiety and anger of single mothers produced anxiety and anger in their adolescent children);
see also Amato, supra note 93 (finding a strong link between the well-being of divorced children
and the well-being and stress of their custodial parents). Cummings and Davies explain:
The stress, frustration, and hopelessness of marital conflict can carry over into parents'
interactions with their children. Marital conflict, parenting impairments. and child
behavior problems have been shown to be interrelated. There is increasing evidence
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case, but Helen cannot afford the experts she needs to explain how
the abuse she has suffered has affected her and the children.
Moreover, the lawyer knows only a little about domestic violence 174
and does not understand the necessity for corroboration of the wife's
allegations and for expert testimony.175 Nonetheless, the lawyer files a
motion requesting supervised visitation for the father pending final
hearing, alleging that the father's violence against Helen endangers
the children. The judge denies the motion7 6 and chastises Helen for
making groundless claims of abuse against the father. 177 The children
frequently visit their father and witness his continued emotional and
psychological abuse of Helen.178
During preparation for the final hearing, the lawyer explains to
Helen that the law favors joint custody and assumes that divorced
children fare best with frequent and substantial contact with both
parents. He also informs her that custody law makes spouse abuse
relevant in custody disputes, but that, having previously lost on that
issue, they risk judicial backlash if they continue to mention it.
The father has Helen examined by a psychologist who finds her
unstable and perhaps paranoid. 79 The psychologist fails to consider
that Helen may be suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder as a
result of the abuse.180 Another psychologist hired by the father
examines the children. The psychologist ignores the abuse the father
has inflicted on Helen and concludes that Helen is alienating the
that negative changes in parent-child relations due to marital conflict are an important
pathway through which family discord contributes to psychopathology in
children.... One implication is that the emotional climate in the house is contagious,
moving across relatively permeable boundaries between the various family subsystems.
E. MARK CUMMINGS & PATRICK DAVIES, CHILDREN AND MARITAL CONFLICT: THE IMPACT
OF FAMILY DISPUTE AND RESOLUTION 107 (1994).
174. See Buel, supra note 91, at 720-22 (noting attorney ignorance about domestic violence);
see also Bryan, supra note 3, at 1223, 1226 & nn.322-26.
175. See Meier, supra note 79, at 1313-14 (illustrating the importance of expert testimony in
cases involving domestic violence against women).
176. Typically judges do not consider the father's violence against the mother relevant to the
father's ability to parent. See Bryan, supra note 3, at 1228 & n.349; Buel, supra note 91, at 735.
177. See Bryan, supra note 3, at 1226 & n.338; Meier, supra note 79, at 1310 (noting that
courts continue to treat allegations of domestic violence with disdain, disbelief and
dismissiveness).
178. Batterers commonly continue to harass their former battered wives. See Buel, supra
note 91, at 736.
179. Meier notes: "Although Freudian concepts of 'female masochism' are less in favor
today, modem psychiatric evaluations still frequently diagnose battered women as 'paranoid,' or
having any of a number of character disorders such as 'Schizoid Personality Disorder,'
'Borderline Personality,' 'Dependent Personality Disorder,' etc." Meier, supra note 79, at 1301.
180. See Buel, supra note 91, at 737 (noting that psychologists making child custody
recommendations frequently ignore domestic violence issues); Meier, supra note 79, at 1312-14.
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children from their father.18' Moreover, Helen's insufficient income
has resulted in frequent moves, depriving the children of the
residential stability they need. The court-appointed guardian ad litem
agrees with the father's psychologist.
Helen's lawyer then tells her that the father has an excellent
chance of winning the custody dispute.' 82  At first she remains
incredulous that the law might award custody of the children to the
man who has abused her and the children. Her prior experiences
with the judge, however, persuade her to accept her lawyer's insight.
At this point, in order to insure her custody of the children, 183 Helen
agrees to accept the father's poor financial offer and his proposed
custody and visitation plan that offers inadequate protection for her
and the children.
After the divorce, Helen cannot return to school to reactivate
her teaching license because she must work two jobs to keep the
family's income above the poverty line. The children now do without
the extras they had grown accustomed to in their pre-divorce family,
and sometimes the necessities as well. Helen's dual employment in
menial jobs restricts her time for parenting and exhausts her mental
and emotional reserves.184 The father continually harasses Helen
verbally and sometimes physically during visitation transitions. 8 He
continues to live in the marital home and maintains a standard of
living higher than during the marriage.
I wish the above scenario were rare. One only need consult the
181. See Buel, supra note 91, at 737-38 (noting that evaluating psychologists may perceive a
battered mother's attempts to protect herself and her child as "alienating" the child from the
father, despite the American Psychological Association's determination that the parental
alienation theory lacks scientific verification).
182. For numerous complex reasons, battered women frequently lose custody of their
children to the perpetrator. See Bryan, supra note 3, at 1219-34; Buel, supra note 91, at 735; see
also CHESLER, supra note 17, at 81 (finding that 59% of the fathers who won custody in
litigation and 50% of the fathers who obtained custody through private negotiations had abused
their wives).
183. Women frequently enter into poor settlement agreements in order to preserve custody
of their children. See supra notes 20, 100.
184. Many divorced children live with financially and logistically stressed single parents who
become less available to the children than before the divorce. See, e.g., ARENDELL, supra note
2, at 61-68, 155-56; DOwD, supra note 6, at 26; Paul R. Amato & Sonia Partridge, Widows and
Divorcees with Dependent Children: Material, Personal, Family, and Social Well-Being, 36 FAM.
RELATIONS 316, 316 (1987).
185. One abused mother who had a joint custody arrangement with her abuser stated:
[Clustody orders ... expose you to harm at all times. You're at the child's school, he's
there. You're at extracurricular activities, he's there. You're at the doctor
appointments ... and he will be there. Do you know what it's like, to be standing next
to the guy who beat your face purple, and you can't protect yourself?
CALIFORNIA GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 254; see also Buel, supra note 91, at 734.
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gender bias reports and empirical studies cited throughout this Essay
to confirm its frequency. Nor do I think it takes an expert to
determine what lessons wives and children must draw from their
divorce experiences. Adrift in a masculine and biased legal system,
mothers cannot protect their children or themselves from men's legal
assaults. Women's courage in challenging their husbands' patriarchal
authority meets with punishment from those whose help they seek.
Experts pervert the truth of women's worlds and cast them as
incompetent, and perhaps mentally ill.186 The bottom line on the
power ledger: women challenge the patriarchal order at their own-
and their children's-peril.
Will these lessons encourage women to become feminists and
seek to right these and other injustices perpetrated against women?
Or do these lessons disillusion and exhaust them, making them
unlikely recruits? Even more problematic, will these lessons send
them back into marriages with men and reinforce patriarchy1 7 -the
very paradigm feminists seek to dismantle?188
Moreover, will divorced women perceive that feminists have
done little for them and resent feminist inaction? And the children,
will they grow up fighting for equality between men and women, or
will they quake before male power? Can feminists continue to allow
the vast numbers of divorced women and forty to fifty percent of
America's children to live these powerful socializing experiences and
expect present and future generations to challenge patriarchal
186. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 119-22; Buel, supra note 91, at 737-38.
187. Ihinger-Tallman & Pasley, supra note 75, at 24 (noting evidence suggesting that
divorced women with fewer economic resources remarry sooner than more financially secure
women and that divorced men show the opposite trend); see also ARENDELL, supra note 2, at
143; MORGAN, supra note 2, at 35-38; Paul C. Glick & Sung-Ling Lin, Recent Changes in
Divorce and Remarriage, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 737, 743 (1986) (speculating that the greater
financial needs of divorced women with children likely encourage them to remarry more quickly
than their childless counterparts). Some divorced women also enter into poor relationships with
men who abuse them and/or their children.
188. As Robin West argues, "The virtual abolition of patriarchy-a political structure that
values men more than women-is the political precondition of a truly ungendered
jurisprudence." West, supra note 145, at 4. Divorce laws more favorable to women do risk
encouraging women to invest in the traditional family form that perpetuates their dependence
on men. See generally Abrams, supra note 133. On the other hand, divorce laws unfavorable to
women risk placing divorced women in financially vulnerable states that also encourage their
dependence on men. Moreover, women who do not remarry, and there are many such women,
risk a significant loss of autonomy because financial hardship severely constricts their life
choices and their ability to maximize their potential. Patriarchy cannot survive if women truly
can choose the terms of their lives. See RICH, supra note 170, at 42-43. Consequently,
enhancing women's autonomy through more favorable divorce laws promotes the ultimate goal
of the feminist movement.
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power? 89 Personally, I think not. I suspect that divorced women may
feel betrayed, rather than assisted, by the feminist movement, making
them unlikely recruits.' 9° Without being overly dramatic, I question
how a movement can survive when it allows its intellectual diversity
to divert its attention from the screaming "real world" needs of so
many of those whom it purports to serve.19'
B. Failure to Acknowledge Women as Mothers
Mary Becker notes, I think rightly, that the legal academy largely
refuses to acknowledge that mothers generally are closer to their
children than fathers192 and to explore the importance to women of
the mother-child bond.193 She posits several strategic reasons for this
silence.' 94 Acknowledging and exploring the differences between
paternal and maternal relationships with children threaten to
189. See Czapanskiy, supra note 44, at 1456 (noting how parental modeling affects children).
I, as I am certain many family law professors, have male and female students who show great
sensitivity to the divorce hardships they and their mothers have endured. They credit their
mothers' strength and show great respect for their mothers' survival skills. But they do not want
to repeat her experience. Nor do they want their children to live what they as divorced children
have experienced. Some indicate a reluctance to marry. Others want to marry, but abhor
divorce. Others resent, but recognize, their fathers' unfair treatment of their mothers and the
legal system's complicity in that treatment. Indeed, many of my women students truly worry
about their vulnerability in marriage, particularly if their parents have divorced.
190. Roberts argues that Black women also may avoid joining the feminist movement
because they fear that Black men may perceive them as disloyal to Black people generally. See
Roberts, supra note 155, at 245.
191. Wishik would describe "necessary" feminist inquiries in family law as: (1) What
experiences of women does family law address?; (2) What assumptions does family law make
about women's experiences?; (3) How does family law distort women's experiences?; (4) How
do the distortions of women's experiences in family law serve patriarchal interests?; (5) How
will proposed reforms affect women practically and ideologically?; (6) How would women's
experiences of family law look in an ideal world?; (7) What can feminists do to get from here to
that ideal world? See Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist
Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64, 72-75 (1985); see also Bartlett, supra note 139.
While certainly feminists have struggled to address these inquiries in family law, divisions within
feminist ranks and the "conspiracy of silence" among legal feminists regarding women's
motherhood have hampered their political effectiveness.
192. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 137. But see Mahoney, supra note 21,
at 19-24 (exploring the meaning of motherhood for battered women).
193. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 159; see also Stephanie M. Wildman,
The Power of Women, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 435, 446-52 (1990) (reviewing CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989), and arguing that a feminist
theory must address women's experiences, including motherhood); Sanger, supra note 71, at 37
(noting critiques of feminist writers and theorists for their insensitivity to a maternal
perspective). But see Littleton, supra note 39, 1310-11 (discussing breast-feeding in a
restaurant).
194. Becker also posits several barriers that might encourage individual women to remain
silent about their feelings regarding motherhood. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20,




reinforce traditional stereotypes about appropriate behavior for
women. 195 These differences also suggest that biology, once again,
controls one's parental destiny, as opposed to the actual caregiving
parents provide for their children. 196
If people see biology as destiny, the actual subordination of
women who fulfill those domestic destinies remains obscure. 197
Moreover, stereotypical beliefs about the essential domestic nature of
women' 98 may support rules, based on such assumptions, that
discriminate against working women. 199 If the husband and wife
ascribe to such beliefs, the wife may find it difficult to negotiate with
her husband anything other than the traditional patriarchal allocation
of family responsibilities.200
If most people believe that women are better caretakers than
men, the assumption soon follows that women "should" be primary
caretakers.2°' Women who lose custody in a society steeped in this
belief risk public branding as failures.2° All women would experience
societal pressure, despite their contrary desires, to have children and
195. See id. at 159. Sanger describes the dominant model of motherhood during the 20th
century as "something closer to 'housewife'-a married, nonworking, inherently selfless, largely
nonsexual, white woman with children." Carol Sanger, M Is for the Many Things, 1 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 15, 18 (1992). Assuming Sanger is correct, one can understand why
modem feminists only reluctantly address motherhood.
196. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 159.
197. See id. Adrienne Rich notes: "Patriarchy could not survive without motherhood and
heterosexuality in their institutional forms; therefore they have to be treated as axioms, as
"nature" itself, not open to question except where, from time to time and place to place,
"alternative life-styles" for certain individuals are tolerated." RICH, supra note 170, at 43. West
acknowledges that compulsory motherhood and heterosexuality undoubtedly constrain,
damage, and oppress women. It does not follow for West that "either motherhood or
intercourse themselves will be, need to be, or ought to be destroyed." West, supra note 148, at
47. Rather these compulsory institutions must be released into the realm of free choice. See id.
She continues:
Now, it is also true-emphatically true-that neither motherhood nor intercourse have
been "released" from patriarchy. Until they are, there is no project more vital to our
understanding of women's present oppression than the description of the subjective
experience of motherhood, and of intercourse, within the patriarchal institutions that
render those activities compulsory.
Id. She encourages feminists to strive to envision motherhood within a nonpatriarchal culture, a
culture in which women have full possession of their bodies, released from compulsory
motherhood and heterosexuality. See id. at 47-48.
198. These beliefs also suggest the sameness of all women, obscuring their individual
differences. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 160.
199. See id. at 159; see also BURGGRAF, supra note 30, at 31-35; MacKinnon, supra note 59,
at 1311-12.
200. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 159.
201. See id. at 159-60; see also BURGGRAF, supra note 30, at 30-31.
202. See CHESLER, supra note 17, at 176-82; Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at
160.
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to establish a better relationship with the children than the fathers.20 3
Becker also suggests that legal feminists fail to explore the
pleasures and pains of women's lives, because insights gained from
such an exploration might cause significant stress.2°4 Becker bases this
assertion on the unpleasant nature of what feminists might discover.
For instance, she notes that women have lower self-esteem than men
and that many women consider competitive success inconsistent with
successful relationships with men.205 Many women who wish to
pursue competitive success, then, might have to face their own deep
psychic ambivalence about their career aspirations-no doubt a
stressful confrontation. Becker argues, however, that if women
avoid stress by refusing to explore their emotional lives, women may
accept the status quo rather than struggle for reform.2°7
Becker concludes her exploration of strategic reasons why legal
feminists might avoid exploring women's motherhood experiences by
noting that such discussions would fail to meet traditional standards
for legal scholarship. 2°8 An untenured woman law professor engaging
in such a dialogue likely would risk her academic employment.2°9
Even a tenured woman law professor engaging in such a dialogue
would risk a negative assessment of her scholarship. 210
Despite Becker's insights regarding the strategic reasons for
silence, she urges legal feminists to break that silence. She argues,
and I agree, that our failure to explore the differences between the
positions of men and women and our fear of essentialism cause us to
ignore women's experiences and constrain our ability to develop legal
changes sensitive to most women's needs. 211
Becker's arguments regarding our need to explore how women
feel about motherhood in order to develop custody standards that
support women's investment in children have application in other
areas of divorce law. 212  Building on the foregoing, I suggest that
203. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 160.
204. See id. at 161.
205. See id.; see also Bryan, supra note 3, at 1188-91; Bryan, supra note 102, at 477-81.
206. See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 20, at 161.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 161-62.
210. See id. at 162.
211. See id. at 165. Wildman also explores how avoiding motherhood can distort the
development of feminist theory. See Wildman, supra note 193, at 446-52.
212. MacKinnon implicitly recognizes the importance of allowing women's voices to fashion
laws that govern women's lives:
Grounding a sex equality approach to reproductive control requires situating
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feminist methodology213 should shape the feminist political agenda on
divorce issues.214 The future feminist political agenda should respond
to the voices of divorced women. 215  The decision to support or
oppose joint custody should emanate from the stories divorced
women tell of that custody arrangement. 216 The decision to or not to
support spousal maintenance should spring from the stories divorced
women tell of their financial experiences subsequent to divorce. The
procedures the legal system should use to resolve contested divorce
issues should respond to women's experiences in those procedures. 21 7
Perhaps, too, developing an agenda based on divorced women's
narratives might broaden the political power of the feminist
movement. 21  More women might perceive and experience feminism
pregnancy in the legal and social context of sex inequality and capturing the unique
relationship between the pregnant woman and her fetus. The legal system has not
adequately conceptualized pregnancy, hence the relationship between the fetus and
the pregnant woman. This may be because the interests, perceptions, and experiences
that have shaped the law have not included those of women. The social conception of
pregnancy that has formed the basis for its legal treatment has not been from the point
of view of the pregnant woman, but rather from the point of view of the observing
outsider, gendered male.
MacKinnon, supra note 59, at 1309.
213. Littleton describes feminist methodology's primary questions as "What has been
women's concrete experience?" and "What has been left out?" Littleton, supra note 39, at
1282; see also Bartlett, supra note 139.
214. This approach also proves consistent with what Dailey terms "empathetic liberalism"-
a commitment to individual diversity within community. Dailey, supra note 156, at 1266.
215. Joan Williams recently employed this strategy by examining Deborah Fallows' book to
decipher why and how women make the work-related decisions that they do. See Williams,
supra note 6, at 100-36 (citing DEBORAH FALLOWS, A MOTHER'S WORK (1985)).
216. Encouraging feminists to listen to the voices of divorced women and fashion responsive
legal reforms also should appeal to feminists who promote the empathetic infusion of human
experience into law. See, e.g., Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1574 (1987). Feminists scholars who promote narratives as a way of understanding also should
prove sympathetic.
217. MacKinnon claims that the contemporary movement among women for civil equality
operates in this fashion:
In recent years, the contemporary movement among women for civil equality has
created a new political practice and form of theory with major implications for law.
The distinctive theory forged by this collective movement is a form of action carried
out through words. It is deeply of the world: raw with women's blood, ragged with
women's pain, shrill with women's screams. It does not elaborate yet more arcane
abstractions of ideas building on ideas. It participates in reality: the reality of a fist in
the face, not the concept of a fist in the face. It does not exist to mediate women's
reality for male consumption. It exists to bear witness, to create consciousness, to
make change. It is not, in a word, academic.
MacKinnon, supra note 59, at 1285 (footnotes omitted). While I quibble somewhat with
MacKinnon's categorization of this political approach as nonacademic, I do suggest here that
legal academic feminists should reconstruct divorce laws and procedures responsive to the pain
and degradation experienced by divorced women.
218. Joan Williams urges feminists to shift their strategy from seeking to improve women's
access to the meaningful work enjoyed only by the privileged to advocating for restructured
market work that better accommodates parental care. She suggests that this strategy might
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as relevant to their lives and come to support the movement.
Divorced women's stories of loss, pain, and humiliation that
attend their downward financial spiral command feminist attention.
219
I encourage feminists to continue their theoretical debates, but to
recognize that theory cannot substitute for political action--if
feminism is to have meaning in divorced women's lives. Effective
political action requires, at minimum, a unified front. Divorced
women's narratives provide a situational truth220 grounded in their
lives that help us to bridge our theoretical differences. All we need to
do is listen.221 Divorced women tell us they need more resources to
dissipate some of the resentment that women of color and working-class women feel toward
feminists because this strategy, if successful, would give working-class women and women of
color greater access to the social ideal of parental care. See WILLIAMS, supra note 156, at 174.
William's strategy also requires feminists to respect the family and openly embrace the value of
caretaking in order to achieve the goal that Williams urges. See id. Stated somewhat
differently, women of color and working class women might find feminism more attractive if
feminist work worked for them and acknowledged their values.
219. In her study of 60 divorced mothers, Terry Arendell found that only 10 mothers did not
experience serious depression or despair after divorce. She comments:
But the reasons they gave simply reemphasize the central importance of economic loss
in the lives of divorced women. Four of these ten had various sources of income that
protected them from poverty and enabled them to work actively toward improving
their situation. Two of them were using income from the divorce property settlement
to attend graduate school, and they hoped to regain their former standard of living by
pursuing professional careers. Two were receiving financial support from their parents
while they sought employment and planned for the possible sale of their homes as part
of the property settlement. The remaining six said they were generally optimistic in
spite of their poor economic positions. Like the others, they found the financial
hardships imposed by divorce surprising and difficult to handle; they simply found
these hardships easier to cope with than the despair they had known in their marriages.
ARENDELL, supra note 2, at 51. Seventy-eight percent of the single-parent mothers studied by
Richards and Schmiege identified financial difficulties as a major problem. All of these mothers
came from middle-class backgrounds. One mother who remarried quickly noted "[flinancially it
got pretty bad towards the end. It was like I was just selling a lot of our stuff like the freezer,
and whatever else we had, just to keep going. It was a trying time." Leslie N. Richards &
Cynthia J. Schmiege, Problems and Strengths of Single-Parent Families: Implications for Practice
and Policy, 42 FAM. REL. 277, 280 (1993); see also WINNER, supra note 9 (quoting the voices of
numerous divorced women throughout). Weitzman notes that divorced women,
disproportionately to divorced men, experience disruptions in their mental and physical health
and that women's economic decline and single parenthood contribute significantly to these
effects. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 349-50.
220. I use the term "situational" truth because I want to acknowledge the provisional nature
of women's experience and to the need to remain sensitive to changes. What works for women
today may not tomorrow.
221. I do not suggest that all women will tell the same story. One mother may enjoy the
freedom that joint physical custody affords her. Another may find the arrangement a
nightmare. What I suggest here is feminist support for reforms that maximize women's choices.
A custody standard that honors caretaking, for instance, expands a mother's choice regarding
custody. She may choose under such a standard to maximize her custodial time with the
children, or she may choose to share custody with the father, if sharing enhances her ability to
fulfill other goals. A standard that mandates joint custody provides her no choice.
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live full and autonomous lives. 2 22 They tell us the importance of their
children. Can we not coalesce around procedural and substantive
reforms that enhance divorced women's choices and their financial
and parental circumstances?
When we listen, spousal maintenance or property law that
captures and equitably divides the post-divorce income stream of
both spouses deserves unified feminist support. This reform will not
help all divorced women because many couples do not accumulate
significant marital assets, and some husbands have little human
capital. 223 But it will help many women-and when we help many
woman, we potentially help all women. 2 4
When we listen, a custody standard that honors the caretaking
that mothers provide z" deserves unified feminist support. Divorced
mothers inform us that children remain their primary concern. 26
And, lacking a standard favoring mothers, they will continue to trade
away whatever is necessary to obtain custody-their financial
security, and sometimes their safety. While I prefer a maternal
deference standard, it seems unrealistic in the current political
climate. A standard honoring caretaking would make mothers the
primary custodians in most cases and simultaneously risk
compromising their workforce participation. Such a standard,
moreover, would not prevent mothers from choosing to relinquish or
share custody.
When we listen, support for children throughout college deserves
unified feminist support. Custodial mothers suffer when they alone
provide college support for their children. 22 They also suffer when
their children cannot attend college, because mothers cannot afford
to assist.
When we listen, we learn that feminists should strive for a post-
divorce reality that honors women's interest in their children and that
222 See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and Possibilities, 1
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 22-23 (1989) (recognizing the usually implicit, sometimes explicit,
relationship between property and autonomy).
223. See Perry, supra note 25.
224. Whenever the circumstances of some women improve, they occupy a position of
greater personal, social, and political power. Feminists encourage such women to exercise their
power responsibly and to turn and help those women less fortunate than themselves. The
knowledge that academic feminists have mobilized to advance their interests might inspire those
less fortunate women to do the same.
225. See Scott, supra note 123 (advocating an approximation standard).
226. See West, supra note 148, at 22-27 (discussing cultural feminism's view of the centrality
of motherhood to women).
227. See supra note 51 for discussion.
[Vol. 75:713
REASKING THE WOMAN QUESTION AT DIVORCE
promotes women's ability to live with as much dignity and
autonomy 228 as possible. When women can choose to raise children
without deprivation, without fear, without humiliation, and most of
all without men, the institution of motherhood becomes a radical
force that challenges the patriarchal order.229 Robin West asks:
What would it mean to mother in a society where women were
deeply valued and respected, in a culture which was woman-
affirming? What would it mean to bear children in the fullness of
our power to care for them, provide for them, in dignity and
pride? ... What would it mean to mother in a society which was
making full use of the spiritual, intellectual, emotional, physical
gifts of women, in all our difference and diversity? What would it
mean to mother in a society which laid no stigma upon lesbians, so
that women grew up with real emotional and erotic options in the
choice of life companions and lovers? What would it mean to live
and die in a culture which affirmed both life and death, in which
both the living world and the bodies of women were released at last
from centuries of violation and control? This is the quantum leap
of the radical feminist vision.2 °
C. Legislatures and Judges
While feminists might coalesce around divorce reforms, external
factors present formidable obstacles. State legislatures constantly
tinker with the statutes governing divorce.23 ' Feminists cannot ignore
the male composition of those legislatures. Can it surprise that
feminist divorce reforms, justified by their ability to enhance women's
228. By autonomy I do not mean the male liberal concept of the alienated, self-centered,
disconnected self. Rather, I refer to the rich understanding of autonomy developing in feminist
theory, including the awareness (1) that patriarchy and traditional liberalism have skewed, and
perhaps perverted, the definition of autonomy-especially for women; (2) that supportive
relations with others foster, rather than squelch, the development of an autonomous self; (3)
and that a feminist definition of autonomy must incorporate women's relatedness to others. See
generally Nedelsky, supra note 222; West, supra note 148.
229. The political and social importance of the struggle for control over children extends
beyond any single mother/father dispute over custody. To the extent that custodial parents
have a better opportunity than noncustodial parents to implant values in the hearts and minds
of their children, the ten million single mothers raising children pose a distinct threat to the
hegemony of patriarchy. See Martha A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of
Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2211 n.74 (1995) (citing that ten million women are single
mothers living with children under 21 years of age). One readily can understand attempts to
stigmatize single mothers and to reinsert fathers into the families of custodial mothers. See
Bryan, supra note 102, at 495-96 & n.237. See generally DOWD, supra note 6; Nancy E. Dowd,
Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (1995); FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 68,
118-19; Fineman, supra, at 2206-07.
230. West, supra note 148, at 57-58.
231. See Levy, supra note 134, at 545-49. See Sampson, supra note 64, for a rather




equality at men's expense, prove unpopular? 2 2 Do they not threaten
to upset the patriarchal subordination of women from which these
very men benefit?
In nineteenth-century America, male legislatures considered
women's claims for equal rights to custody of their children too
disruptive of family stability 233 because such rights might encourage
women to leave their husbands.2m Divorce laws that promote
substantive equality between wives and husbands raise the same, not
always unconscious, fear. No longer would anticipation of financial
ruin or loss of custody necessarily keep women trapped in poor
marriages. Perhaps an even more important concern to men, these
laws would relieve men of assets and income they now consider
theirs.
Despite the fears of nineteenth-century legislatures, by the mid-
1930s, forty-two states had legislation granting mothers custody rights
equal to those of fathers.235 A change in feminist rhetoric helped
accomplish this. The second wave of feminism, headed by social
feminists, abandoned the "rights" rhetoric of the first wave of
feminism. Instead, poor children and their families became the
focus,26 and feminists presented legislative reform in terms of child
welfare.237  In making children their concern, social feminists did
reinforce nineteenth-century stereotypes about the proper roles of
women and men: the family remained women's sphere, whereas the
world belonged to men.238 Although this strategy may have done little
to change the sources of women's inequality to men,239 the social
232. As MacKinnon notes, when Abagail Adams pled with John Adams to "remember the
ladies" in founding the United States, he replied, "We know better than to repeal our Masculine
systems." MacKinnon, supra note 59, at 1281 (citing ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 370,
382 (L. Butterfield ed., 1963). Levy notes that divorce issues have become highly politicized and
that law review writings exert precious little influence in political marketplaces. Levy, supra
note 134, at 551.
233. See MASON, supra note 49, at 82.
234. See id. at 90.
235. See id. at 114.
236. See id. at 89.
237. See id. at 115.
238. See id. at 89.
239. See id. Limiting women to traditional gender roles can retard their personal as well as
political progress. Some argue that the masculine gender role results from the privileges and
benefits that attend a dominant social position, maintains men's dominant status, and justifies
male exploitation of others. See Collins, supra note 139, at 99. In contrast, the feminine gender
role contains adaptive behaviors that develop in response to women's efforts to cope and/or
survive their subordinate life position. See id. Consequently, if women frame their political
arguments in a manner consistent with their traditional gender roles, they may encourage their
own and others' continued acceptance of their subordinate position.
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feminists did make important political gains for women, including
suffrage and equal custodial rights for mothers.240
Learning from the above example, perhaps a feminist rhetoric
more appealing to male legislatures might prove helpful in
implementing feminist proposals. Few can disagree that children
represent our collective future. If feminists emphasized how their
reforms would benefit divorced children, perhaps male legislators
would find the reforms more palatable, even morally compelling. The
case is easy to make. I provide only a few of the many arguments.
The rate of poverty among U.S. children is one-third higher than
two decades ago and 1.5 to 4 times as high as the rates for children in
Canada and Western Europe. 241 Events like divorce sometimes
permanently alter a family's economic and social position,242 with
divorce contributing significantly to the rise in poverty among
children.243 By the time they reach the age of sixteen, approximately
240. See MASON, supra note 49, at 89, 114-15.
241. See Greg J. Duncan et al., How Much Does Childhood Poverty Affect the Life Chances
of Children, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 406, 406 (1998); see also Jeanne Brooks-Gunn et al., Poor
Families, Poor Outcomes: The Well-Being of Children and Youth, in CONSEQUENCES OF
GROWING UP POOR 1, 1 (Greg J. Duncan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1997). By 1993,
researchers estimate that 29% of children in the United States lived in poverty. See Donald J.
Hernandez, Poverty Trends, in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR, supra, at 18,20. Black
and Hispanic children are more likely than white children to experience poverty and for longer
periods of time. See Brooks-Gunn et al., supra, at 4-5.
242. Beginning in 1983, Suzanne Bianchi and Edith McArthur used Census Bureau data to
track 20,000 households for 32 months, interviewing members at four-month intervals. Within
16 months of divorce, after adjusting for the decrease in family size, the income of the family in
which the child lived declined by 29%. See Jason DeParle, Child Poverty Twice as Likely after
Family Split, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1991, at A8. Many observe the permanence of the
economic decline following divorce. See MORGAN, supra note 2, at 27; Duncan et al., supra
note 241, at 406; Alfred J. Kahn & Sheila B. Kamerman, Child Support in the United States: The
Problem, in CHILD SUPPORT: FROM DEBT COLLECTION TO SOCIAL POLICY 10, 10 (Alfred J.
Kahn & Sheila B. Kamerman eds., 1988); see also Garrison, Child Support Policy, supra note 2,
at 157 & nn.2-3. Researchers note that the economic deprivation children experience at divorce
has immediate negative consequences that extend into adulthood. See Scott J. South et al.,
Children's Residential Mobility and Neighborhood Environment Following Parental Divorce and
Remarriage, 77 Soc. FORCES 667, 667-68 (1998).
243. See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 42 & n.5; Brooks-Gunn et al., supra note 241, at 4;
DeParle, supra note 242 (discussing a study by Suzanne Bianchi and Edith McArthur that found
children to be twice as likely to live in poverty after a divorce than before; specifically, the
percentage of impoverished children increased from 19% to 36% within four months of
divorce); Garrison, Child Support Policy, supra note 2, at 157; see also, e.g., ARENDELL, supra
note 2, at 153-57; CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 23, 25
(1991) (showing that approximately one in five children in the United States lives in poverty;
one in two children living in a female-headed, one-parent home lives in poverty; and that
approximately one in 10 children living with both parents lives in poverty). Approximately one-
half of mother-only families in the United States live in poverty. See Sara S. McLanahan, Parent
Absence or Poverty: Which Matters More?, in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR supra
note 241. at 35. Approximately 65% of single-parent families result from marital separation or
divorce. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
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fifty percent of our children will experience the divorce of their
parents2" and the economic consequences that follow.245
Inadequate food, 246 housing, 247 and medical care, 248 threaten
divorced children's physical health.249  The financial deprivation
POPULATION REPORTS, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS 79 (1987). And,
approximately 90% of divorced children live with a single-parent mother. See Hetherington et
al., supra note 94, at 305.
244. See, e.g., WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 352; Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., History and
Current Status of Divorce in the United States, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN AND
DIVORCE 29, 35 (Richard E. Behrman ed., 1994); Kahn & Kamerman, supra note 242, at 10;
McLanahan, supra note 243, at 35.
245. After reviewing several studies that address the relation between family income and
divorced children's well-being, McLanahan concludes that income affects nearly every measure
of divorced children's well-being, but that income does not explain completely the negative
effects of divorce on children. See McLanahan, supra note 243, at 45-47 & tbl.3.3. She further
explains:
Does family structure matter more than income? The answer is also ambiguous. The
twelve studies show that although family structure is related to poverty, the two are
not proxies for one another. In most instances, coming from a nonintact family
reduces a child's chances of success, even after low income is taken into account. In
some instances, the net effect of family structure is larger than the net effect of
poverty: on others, it is smaller. Based on these studies, I suspect that family structure
is more important than poverty in determining behavioral and psychological problems,
whereas poverty is more important than family structure in determining educational
attainment.
Id. at 47-48. She concludes:
The fact that parental absence still matters after taking income into account does not
imply that policy makers should not try to minimize the economic distress of single
mothers. Indeed, based on what is known to date, reducing the economic insecurity of
families headed by single mothers is probably the most effective tool for protecting
children from the negative consequences of family disruption. Reducing poverty might
also mitigate some of the negative effects of living in a stepfamily. If single mothers
were more economically secure, they might take more time in selecting a new partner,
which, in turn, might make remarriage more beneficial to children.
Id. at 48.
246. Consider, for example, the voices of mothers in Weitzman's study:
We ate macaroni and cheese five nights a week. There was a Safeway special for 39
cents a box. We could eat seven dinners for $3.00 a week.... I think that's all we ate
for months. I applied for welfare.... It was the worst experience of my life.... I never
dreamed that I, a middle class housewife, would ever be in a position like that. It was
humiliating.., they make you feel it.... But we were desperate, and I had to feed my
kids. You name it, I tried it-food stamps, soup kitchens, shelters. It just about killed
me to have the kids live like that.... I finally called my parents and said we were
coming... we couldn't have survived without them.
WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 339. Weitzman observes of other mothers:
In addition to scaled-down budgets for food ("We learned to love chicken backs") and
clothing ("At Christmas I splurged at the Salvation Army-the only "new clothes they
got all year"), many spoke of cutting down on their children's school lunches ("I used
to plan a nourishing lunch with fruit and juice; now she's lucky if we have a slice of
ham for a sandwich") and school supplies and after-school activities ("he had to quit
the Little League and get a job as a delivery boy").
Id. at 340.
247. See Williams, supra note 19, at 2233-34.
24& See ARENDELL, supra note 2, at 17, 40; PETER J. CUNNINGHAM & BETH A. HAHN, 4
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CRITICAL HEALTH ISSUES FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH 24 (1994).
249. See Sanders Korenman & Jane E. Miller, Effects of Long-Term Poverty on Physical
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divorced children experience inhibits their academic, social, and
psychological development.250 In a two-year study of a random
nationwide sample of 699 elementary grade children, Guidubaldi and
Perry found that divorced children performed more poorly on nine of
thirty mental health measures than children from intact families. 25
When these researchers controlled for income level of custodial
households, the group of divorced children scored differently on only
two mental health measures. 252 Divorced children living in families
with inadequate income have high levels of anxiety and depression 253
and perform more poorly at school.254  Research on the early
Health of Children in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, in CONSEQUENCES OF
GROWING UP POOR, supra note 243, at 70, 71, 92 (noting that poverty during the prenatal
period or during early childhood proves particularly detrimental to the health and development
of children).
250. See Garrison, Child Support Policy, supra note 2, at 157. The negative effects of
divorce on children prove unrelated to the child's age or stage of development at the time of
divorce, with marital disruptions in adolescence proving as harmful as disruptions in early
childhood. See McLanahan, supra note 243, at 37. Moreover, the time children spend in a
single-parent household is not significantly related to children's well-being, and remarriage of
the custodial parent does not mitigate the negative consequences for children of having lived in
a single-parent household. See id.
251. See John Guidubaldi & Joseph D. Perry, Divorce and Mental Health Sequelae for
Children: A Two-Year Follow-Up of a Nationwide Sample, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD
PSYCHIATRY 531, 533-44 (1985). Divorced children evidenced higher frequencies of
dependency, irrelevant talk, withdrawal, blaming, inattention, decreased work effort,
inappropriate behavior, unhappiness, and maladaptive symptoms. See id.
252. See id. Boys from divorced homes, however, performed lower on four mental health
measures than boys from intact families. The only difference remaining between girls from
divorced homes and girls from intact families concerned internal locus of control, a self-esteem
measure. Girls from divorced households actually exhibited higher internal locus of control
than did girls from intact families. See id. One mother illustrates how diminished financial
status can affect a child's self-esteem:
I had $950 a month, and the house payment was $760, so there was hardly anything left
over. So there we were: my son qualified for free lunches at school. We'd been living
on over $4,000 a month, and there we were. That's so humiliating. What that does to
the self-esteem of even a child is absolutely unbelievable. And it isn't hidden;
everybody knows the situation. They knew at his school that he was the kid with the
free lunch coupons.... My son is real tall and growing. I really didn't have the money
to buy him clothes, and attorneys don't think school clothes are essential. So he was
wearing these sweatshirts that were too small for him. Then one day he didn't want to
go to school because the kids had been calling him Frankenstein because his arms and
legs were hanging out of his clothes-they were too short. That does terrible things to
a kid, it really does. We just weren't equipped to cope with it.
ARENDELL, supra note 2, at 49.
253. See Greg J. Duncan et al., supra note 241, at 407 (1998); William F. Hodges et al., The
Cumulative Effect of Stress on Preschool Children of Divorced and Intact Families, 46 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 611, 614 (1984) (explaining that children of divorced families with
inadequate income had substantially higher levels of anxiety-depression); see also WEITZMAN,
supra note 2, at 354.
254. Downey found that children in single-mother and single-father households performed
equally well in school, but that both groups performed more poorly than did children from
intact families. Economic deprivation explained the poor performance of children in single-
mother households, whereas interpersonal deprivation explained the poor performance of
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cognitive and physical development of children suggests that family
income during the first five years of life correlates strongly with
developmental outcomes in early and middle childhood. 255 Family
income in early childhood also exerts a strong influence on
achievement and completed years of schooling.2 6 Family income also
affects the academic achievement of adolescents.257 Moreover, the
economic pressures experienced by low-income families frequently
compromise the quality of the mother's parenting, 25 8 which in turn
undermines the self-confidence and achievement of adolescent
children. 25 9
children in single-father households. See Douglas B. Downey, The School Performance of
Children from Single-Mother and Single-Father Families, 15 J. FAM. ISSUES 129, 144-45 (1994);
see also McLanahan, supra note 243, at 37 (noting that income explains 50% of the difference in
educational achievement of children raised in one- and two-parent families); Sara McLanahan,
Family Structure and the Reproduction of Poverty, 90 AM. J. Soc. 873, 888-89, 897 (1985)
(finding that the economic deprivation of white children living in single-mother households
substantially diminished the children's success in school).
255. See Duncan et al., supra note 241, at 407. Low family income in early childhood
negatively affects intelligence and verbal test scores and promotes behavior problems such as
aggression, tantrums, anxiety, and moodiness. See Brooks-Gunn et al., supra note 241, at 10; see
also Judith R. Smith et al., Consequences of Living in Poverty for Young Children's Cognitive
and Verbal Ability and Early School Achievement, in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR,
supra note 241, at 132, 164. The longer the child lives in poverty, the more detrimental are
poverty's affects upon the child. See Brooks-Gunn et al., supra note 241, at 12; Smith et al.,
supra.
256. See Duncan et al., supra note 241, at 420; Garrison, Child Support Policy, supra note 2,
at 157 & n.4; McLanahan, supra note 243, at 41; see also Jean M. Gerard & Cheryl Buehler,
Multiple Risk Factors in the Family Environment and Youth Problem Behaviors, 61 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 343, 356 (1999) (explaining that the association between poverty and youth
problem behaviors may result from the lack of educational resources in the home, promoting
academic failure that triggers misbehavior or emotional distress in school).
257. See Greg J. Duncan et al., supra note 241, at 409; Rand D. Conger et al., Family
Economic Hardship and Adolescent Adjustment: Mediating and Moderating Processes, in
CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR, supra note 241, at 288, 307-10. Divorced children
generally attain lower levels of education and economic achievement than children raised in
intact families. See DOWD, supra note 6, at 25-26; WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 51,
at 160 (noting that divorce chills the hopes, aspirations, and achievements of children); see also
Paul R. Amato & Bruce Keith, Separation from a Parent During Childhood and Adult
Socioeconomic Attainment, 70 SOC. FORCES 187, 193-98, 200, 202-03 (1991); Verna M. Keith &
Barbara Finlay, The Impact of Parental Divorce on Children's Educational Attainment, Marital
Timing, and Likelihood of Divorce, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 797, 798-99 (1988); Sheila
Fitzgerald Krein & Andrea H. Belier, Educational Attainment of Children from Single-Parent
Families: Differences by Exposure, Gender, and Race, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 221, 222-24 (1988).
258. Many divorced children live with financially and logistically stressed single parents who
become less available to the children than before the divorce. See, e.g., ARENDELL, supra note
2, at 61-68, 155-56; DOWD, supra note 6, at 26; Amato & Partridge, supra note 184, at 316;
Colletta, supra note 182, at 23-27; David H. Demo, Parent-Child Relations: Assessing Recent
Changes, 54 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 104, 110-11 (1992); Hetherington et al., supra note 94;
Richards & Schmiege, supra note 219, at 280 fig.6. Not only must these children adjust to less
contact with noncustodial parents, they also must cope with the diminished capacity and
availability of custodial parents. See Bryan, supra note 3, at 1162-63 & nn.38-40.
259. See Duncan et al., supra note 241, at 409.
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Growing up in a family with limited financial resources260 or in a
family headed by a single parent 261  increases the risk of
unemployment as young adults transition into the workforce. 262
Unemployment for Western youths produces many negative
consequences, such as psychosocial and economic problems. 263
Moreover, unemployed persons experience more conflict within their
families, commit more crime, and suffer more mental health and
psychological problems than do employed persons.264
Single-parent families move more frequently than do two-parent
families,265 especially immediately after a divorce.2 66  Residential
mobility negatively affects children's academic achievement, their
behavior, and their educational attainment. 267 Some explain that
residential mobility lessens the "social capital" of children and
adolescents. The social connections children and adolescents develop
in their families and their communities encourage their cognitive and
social development. Divorce can lessen the child's social capital by
disrupting family relations and by precipitating a residential move
that severs the child's bonds to the community.264 High degrees of
environmental change also correlate with children's depression, social
withdrawal, aggression, and delinquency.269
Residential mobility at divorce also can negatively affect a child
if the child moves to a poorer neighborhood. Recent research
suggests that children who remain with their mothers after divorce
260. See Avshalom Caspi et al., Early Failure in the Labor Market: Childhood and
Adolescent Predictors of Unemployment in the Transition to Adulthood, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 424,
426, 438, 443 (1998).
261. See id. at 428, 438, 443.
262. Other factors also predict unemployment. Lack of a school certificate (the equivalent
of an American high school diploma), low reading scores, family conflict, weak parental
attachment, maleness, delinquent behavior, and poor physical health all play a role, see id. at
438, 443, so too do low intelligence, behavior problems during ages seven to nine, see id. at 439,
443, and difficult temperament during ages three to five. See id. at 440. Consequently, personal
and family characteristics contribute to the employment potential of young adults long before
they enter the labor force. See id. at 443.
263. See id. at 430-31.
264. See id. at 424.
265. See South et al., supra note 242, at 668.
266. See id. Multiple moves, undertaken for economic reasons, deprive children of familiar
peers, neighborhoods, and schools. See DOWD, supra note 6, at 26; see also JUDITH S.
WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND
PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 183 (1980); Seltzer, supra note 93, at 245.
267. See South et al., supra note 242, at 669.
268. Id.; see aLso DOWD, supra note 6, at 26; WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 266, at
183; Seltzer, supra note 93, at 245.
269. See Lawrence A. Kurdek, An Integrative Perspective on Children's Divorce Adjustment,
36 AM. PSYCHOL. 856, 858 (1981).
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experience a higher residential mobility rate than children in intact
families,270 especially if their parents owned rather than rented the
family home.271  Moreover, these children frequently move to
neighborhoods of lower economic status.272 The negative impact of
divorce on the child's family income largely explains the move to
neighborhoods of lower economic status.273 Studies also indicate that
the presence of poor neighbors, or the absence of affluent neighbors,
correlates positively with children's lower educational attainment,
school performance, and cognitive development. 274
Conger et al. distill the argument embedded in the above
paragraphs: "Financial security, independently of parental
functioning, appears to influence children's ability to think effectively
and perform well in an academic setting. To place children in
seriously deprived economic circumstances creates enormous social
risks by threatening to reduce the human capital necessary to
maintain a globally competitive, modern society. '275
Another compelling argument involves the social and financial
expenditures states inevitably must make to respond to the
consequences of divorce. Living in a poorer neighborhood decreases
maternal warmth and increases the likelihood that a child will engage
in early sexual activity and/or bear a child.276 Children living in poorer
neighborhoods also engage in more delinquent behavior. 277  An
270. See South et al., supra note 242, at 676, 686. The residential mobility rate for children
who remain with their fathers after divorce, however, is slightly higher than for children who
remain with their mothers. See id. at 677, 680. Moreover, divorced children who move with
their custodial fathers tend to move to neighborhoods of lesser economic status than children
who move with their custodial mothers. See id. at 677.
271. See id. at 669-70, 684-85, 686.
272. See id. at 682. Black children appear more vulnerable than white children to downward
neighborhood mobility. See id. at 684.
273. See id. at 684, 686.
274. See id. at 669-70. Researchers consistently find that divorced children attain lower
levels of educational and economic achievement than children raised in intact families. See
DOWD, supra note 6, at 25-26; WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 51, at 160 (noting that
divorce chills the hopes, aspirations, and achievements of children); see also Amato & Keith,
supra note 257, at 193-98, 200, 202-03; Keith & Finlay, supra note 257, at 798-99; Krein & Beler,
supra note 257, at 222-24.
275. Conger et al., supra note 257, at 309. Moir notes that if Wallerstein and Kelly are
correct that more than one-third of divorced children are chronically impaired, and if one-half
of our children experience the divorce of their parents, then one-sixth of our population will
face a disabled adulthood because of divorce. See Donald S. Moir, No Fault Divorce and the
Best Interests of Children, 69 DENV. U. L. REv. 663, 672 (1992).
276. See South et al., supra note 242, at 670.
277. See id.; see also DOWD, supra note 6, at 25-26 (noting that poverty in single-parent
families correlates with children's criminal activity); Demo, supra note 258, at 110; Seltzer, supra
note 93, at 238. Melton notes that "poverty accounts for the greatest portion of variance in
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emphasis on the costs associated with the laws governing divorce
might prove more attractive to male legislators than the equal rights
of women.
I suggest a change in rhetoric, not in substance. Many feminist
divorce reforms benefit children "and" women. A custody standard
that rewards caretaking and encourages parental involvement with
children benefits children as well as women. It would place the child
with the parent who has shown a prior willingness to put the interests
of the child before his or her own, and it would provide the needed
continuity and stability in the child's relationship with her
caretakers. 278 The standard also would encourage parental investment
in children during marriage, because the law would protect that
investment at divorce. Any financial reform that benefits divorced
mothers also benefits the children for whom they care -as well as our
collective good.
Changing feminist rhetoric from women's rights and equality to
collective good conflates women's concerns with those of children
and poses the risks identified above. Yet the pain and degradation so
many women experience at divorce warrants some compromise.
Conflating women's concerns with those of children for purposes of
divorce reform does not preclude feminists from promoting women's
rights and women's equality to men. A different political strategy
might promote these very concerns on the ground-if not in theory.
To effectuate reform, feminists must lobby legislators, and the
task is not easy.279 Fathers' rights groups bring formidable resources
and political savvy to the legislative arena. They also speak to a
sympathetic constituency of male legislators, some of whom identify
strongly with their message. Yet if feminists mobilized the women
community rates of delinquency and child maltreatment, neighborhood quality accounts for
much of the remainder." Gary B. Melton, Children, Families, and the Courts in the Twenty-First
Century, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1993,2003 (1993) (citations omitted).
27& See Katherine Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 902-
10 (1984); Jacobs, supra note 67, at 884-85.
279. Recent developments in West Virginia custody law illustrates that feminist legal
academics can, at least, avert disaster. Recently, the West Virginia legislature rejected the
primary caretaker presumption that the West Virginia Supreme Court established in Garska v.
McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981). See Levy, supra note 134, at 558 n.54. Although they
could not convince the legislature to retain the primary caretaker standard, several women legal
academics at the University of West Virginia College of Law helped convince the legislature to
abandon its preference for a presumption in favor of joint custody. Instead, the legislature




and sympathetic men in their communities, 2  disseminated
information on how individual legislators voted, and put their
collective political power behind reforms, legislators might feel
compelled, even if reluctant, to respond. One purpose of this Essay is
to convince feminists, especially feminist legal academics, that divorce
issues warrant such an investment.81
One more external obstacle requires mention. Judges as well as
legislators influence the evolution of divorce law. Judicial bias and
incompetence present a barrier to implementation of feminist
reforms. Judges must receive specialized education on family issues,
and only judges committed to family law should address divorce
cases.
Because of the importance of divorce issues, the proposal that
only qualified and committed judicial personnel should address them
hardly seems arguable. But, of course, it is. Feminists must pressure
legislatures and state supreme courts to reform their divorce courts,
and to finance those reforms.
CONCLUSION
I do not here list every reform feminists must support or every
barrier they must storm. Rather, I seek only to persuade feminists to
overcome their theoretical differences, to recognize the importance of
divorce issues to women and to the feminist movement, and to
develop political and legal agendas that respond to women's
narratives about divorce. Certainly feminists have effectively
mobilized in other areas important to women. 282 I argue only that
political and legal action in this area also deserves their collective
effort. A woman's right to keep her child at divorce commands as
280. Even this task may prove difficult. Many women do not understand, until they live the
experience, their vulnerability at divorce. Denial and false consciousness remain a problem for
feminists to confront.
281. I do not mean to suggest that feminists have failed totally to lobby legislatures, but
some efforts have resulted in laws insensitive to the needs of women. For instance, Fineman
criticizes the middle- and upper-class professional women who helped persuade the Wisconsin
legislature to enact an equal distribution property statute because the statute treated poor and
working-class wives unfairly. See Fineman, supra note 108. Moreover, this Essay addresses
feminist legal academics, not all feminists generally. Although undoubtedly some feminist legal
academics have testified before legislatures on divorce issues, their political activism should
intensify and more individuals should participate.
282- See, e.g., Littleton, supra note 147, at 23 n.34 (crediting Wendy Williams of Georgetown
University Law School for her role in inducing Congress to amend the Family and Medical
Leave Act to declare that discrimination on the basis of the bearing of and the birthing of
children constituted discrimination on the basis of sex).
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much or more respect as a woman's right to choose to abort 833
283. See Reva B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in
MOTHERS IN LAW, supra note 67, at 43, 43-44, 59-62 (noting the considerable feminist effort
exerted on abortion issues); see also Bartlett, supra note 1, at 488-94 (discussing feminist
contributions to reproductive rights).
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